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Article

Delinking Reimbursement
Rachel E. Sachs†
INTRODUCTION
Recently, scholars and policymakers on both sides of the
aisle have become interested in the legal and regulatory structures surrounding pharmaceutical approval and reimbursement
in this country. Scholars focusing on the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have considered the ways in which it ought to
regulate emerging technologies, 1 debated the optimal level of evidence required for approval, 2 and explored the ways in which

† Associate Professor, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law.
For their extremely thoughtful comments, I would like to thank Bob Bohrer,
Erin Fuse Brown, Glenn Cohen, Nicholson Price, Liz Sepper, Patti Zettler, and
the participants in Minnesota Law Review’s 2017 Symposium, the 2017 ASLME
Conference, the 2017 Wiet Life Sciences Conference, Harvard Law School’s Petrie-Flom Center Health Law Workshop, the Seattle University School of Law
faculty workshop, the St. Louis University School of Law faculty workshop, and
Stanford Law School’s 2018 BioLaw Conference. Disclosure: the author is a
member of the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review’s Midwest Comparative Effectiveness Public Advisory Council. Copyright © 2018 by Rachel E.
Sachs.
1. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine,
116 MICH. L. REV. 421 (2017) (proposing a disclosure-based regulatory regime
for medical algorithms); Rachel E. Sachs & Carolyn A. Edelstein, Ensuring the
Safe and Effective FDA Regulation of Fecal Microbiota Transplantation, 2 J.L.
BIOSCIENCES 396 (2015) (examining the challenges of regulating fecal microbiota transplantation as a biologic drug); Patricia J. Zettler et al., Closing the Regulatory Gap for Synthetic Nicotine, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (discussing the need for regulation to keep up with new, synthetic substances).
2. Compare Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Approving a Problematic
Muscular Dystrophy Drug: Implications for FDA Policy, 316 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
2357 (2016) (arguing that the FDA approved the drug eteplirsen prematurely),
with Vahid Montazerhodjat & Andrew W. Lo, Is the FDA Too Conservative or
Too Aggressive?: A Bayesian Decision Analysis of Clinical Trial Design (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21499, 2015) (using Bayesian
analysis to demonstrate that the FDA can be overly conservative regarding
drugs that treat life-threatening illnesses).
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pharmaceutical companies seek to game various FDA requirements to extend their patent monopolies. 3 Scholars focusing on
reimbursement have argued that existing payment systems do
not provide optimal incentives to payers or providers, 4 and have
examined the relationship between insurance regulation and patient costs for new drugs.5
In the policy arena, efforts like the 21st Century Cures Act 6
claim to modernize the FDA, encouraging agency officials to
think carefully about the development of new healthcare technologies in an age of personalized medicine.7 At the same time,
concerns about the ever-increasing prices of drugs have led to a
host of proposals for reform, some wholesale 8 and some piecemeal.9 Although legislators have yet to take meaningful action
to lower drug prices on the federal level, state legislators have
3. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen Petitions: Long,
Late-Filed, and at-Last Denied, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 305 (2016) (exposing the potential for citizen petitions to be used to extend brand monopolies by delaying
generic approval); Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499 (2016) (describing how pharmaceutical companies take advantage of nuances in the
Hatch-Waxman Act to hold off generic competition); Jordan Paradise, REMS as
a Competitive Tactic: Is Big Pharma Hijacking Drug Access and Patient Safety?,
15 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 43 (2015) (describing how FDA risk evaluation
and mitigation strategies are used to inhibit generic competition).
4. See, e.g., MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 119 (June 2016),
http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/june-2016-report-to-the
-congress-medicare-and-the-health-care-delivery-system.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [hereinafter MEDPAC] (proposing adjustments to Part B payments to change incentives); Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153 (2016)
(discussing the potential for prescription drug insurance to remedy distortions
in the patent system that have led to the underdevelopment of drugs).
5. See, e.g., Stacie B. Dusetzina et al., Association of Prescription Drug
Price Rebates in Medicare Part D with Patient Out-of-Pocket and Federal Spending, 177 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 1185, 1185–86 (2017); Stacie B.
Dusetzina et al., Out-of-Pocket and Health Care Spending Changes for Patients
Using Orally Administered Anticancer Therapy After Adoption of State Parity
Laws, J. AM. MED. ASS’N ONCOLOGY (Nov. 9, 2017), https://jamanetwork.com/
journals/jamaoncology/fullarticle/2661763.
6. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
7. 21st Century Cures, ENERGY & COM. SUBCOMMITTEE, https://
energycommerce.house.gov/cures (last visited June 18, 2018) (claiming that the
21st Century Cures Act updates an outdated regulatory apparatus).
8. Improving Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, S. 771, 115th
Cong. (2017) (proposing reforms to all aspects of the innovation and access process).
9. Creating and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples (CREATES) Act of 2017, S. 974, 115th Cong. (proposing reforms to the process by
which generic drug companies access samples to demonstrate bioequivalence).
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aimed to fill the void, advancing eighty bills on the topic in thirty
states in 2017 alone. 10
Yet too often, those who focus on the FDA and those who
focus on reimbursement fail to appreciate the links between the
two programs. At least in the United States, FDA approval and
insurance reimbursement for prescription drugs are tightly
linked by law, in a way that affects policy choices on both sides
of the equation. 11 It is critical that scholars and policymakers
come to understand this linkage. Understanding the relationship between approval and reimbursement is key to effective policymaking. Lawmakers must seek to ensure that policies are actually capable of having their intended effect, and that they do
not also have significant unintended consequences. This Article
considers the ways in which approval and reimbursement are
linked in the United States and envisions a system in which the
two are delinked, if only partially.
Part I provides an overview of the legal relationship between
FDA approval and insurance reimbursement. In the United
States, federal law requires Medicare and Medicaid to cover
most, and in many cases all, FDA-approved drugs. 12 Private payers are typically subject to regulation as well, either through
state-level coverage mandates for particular sets of drugs or
through the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) essential health benefits requirements for plans sold on the individual and smallgroup markets. 13 Part II explores the ways in which this legal
linkage affects our policy choices. Existing proposals that would
require the FDA to approve drugs on the basis of less (or less
robust) evidence would statistically result in the approval of
more unsafe, ineffective drugs 14—and Medicare and Medicaid
would need to pay for all of them. Reform of the FDA’s approval
system without accompanying reform to insurance reimbursement would be more likely to increase costs, rather than decrease them. Similarly, it is not productive as a policy matter to
permit Medicare to negotiate the price of prescription drugs if
the government cannot walk away from the deal a pharmaceutical company is offering.
10. AARON BERMAN ET AL., YALE GLOB. HEALTH JUSTICE P’SHIP, CURBING
UNFAIR DRUG PRICES: A PRIMER FOR STATES 3 (2017), https://law.yale.edu/
system/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/curbing_unfair_drug_prices-policy_
paper-080717.pdf.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
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Part III envisions a thought experiment, considering what
the potential policy impacts of strongly delinking approval and
reimbursement might be. Specifically, what would be the implications for both innovation and access if payers like Medicare
and Medicaid were not required to cover these products? There
are at least three potential consequences, although their precise
reach undoubtedly depends on the scope of revisions made to existing law. First, there would likely be some reduction in access
to these medicines. If payers are not legally required to cover
certain drugs, they will no longer choose to.
Second, if pharmaceutical companies know that coverage is
not automatic—that they must earn coverage, perhaps by
demonstrating their product’s efficacy over competing drugs—
then they may innovate more thoughtfully, in ways that are socially valuable. For instance, we may gain additional information as a society about the comparative costs and benefits of
different drugs in a particular class.
Third, strong delinkage would help address the drug pricing
problem, precisely because of both of the above considerations. A
government which can credibly follow through on the threat not
to cover a particular product can extract greater discounts in
agreeing to cover it.
Part IV examines three real-world delinkage models to evaluate the potential likelihood that each of these policy outcomes
would be realized. In the United States, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is permitted to construct a formulary, unlike
Medicare and Medicaid. This delinkage has resulted in lower
drug spending, but it has also decreased access to medicines by
some amount. 15 The model deployed in many European countries has displayed similar results, with national payers or regulators negotiating on behalf of their citizens. 16 However, in neither case have policymakers observed the development of
relevant data about the comparative effectiveness of drugs in a
given class. Another American delinkage model, our system of
approving and covering medical devices,17 illustrates some of the
policy concerns that might arise for drug companies if the two
regulatory systems are delinked.
Part V considers policy options short of full delinkage that
might help achieve key benefits of delinkage while avoiding
some of its most concerning impacts. Focusing on the theoretical
15. See infra Part IV.A.
16. See infra Part IV.B.
17. See infra Part IV.C.
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justifications for the structure of both the FDA approval system
and public insurance system, Part V links theories of regulation
and innovation with specific policy options. The traditional theory of the FDA as a consumer protection agency might counsel
in favor of a carefully designed partial delinkage approach like
the one recently considered by the state of Massachusetts.18 The
more modern theory that understands the FDA as an innovation-focused, information-producing agency might encourage collaboration between the FDA and the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) to accomplish mutual goals.19 In addition, more recent scholarship that has considered the role of
CMS as an innovation agency in its own right reveals a range of
solutions targeted at modernizing our reimbursement system. 20
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FDA APPROVAL AND
INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT
Although there is not always perfect agreement between the
set of FDA-approved drugs and the drugs payers are required to
cover, in general there is significant overlap. Particularly for
public payers, this robust coverage of prescription drugs is required by federal law. Although private payers are often less constrained, many of them provide similarly comprehensive prescription drug coverage pursuant to federal and state laws. This
Part presents these various legal regimes and considers the
ways in which they are expressed across a range of particularly
relevant examples.
A. PUBLIC PAYERS
In the United States, CMS provides insurance to over
100,000,000 Americans through Medicare and Medicaid. 21 These
two programs were enacted together, as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, 22 but the two differ along a range of
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2016 JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 109 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency
-Information/PerformanceBudget/Downloads/FY2016-CJ-Final.pdf [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR 2016 JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES].
22. Key Milestones in Medicare and Medicaid History, Selected Years: 1965–
2003, 27 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 1, 1 (2005), https://www.cms.gov/Research
-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/HealthCareFinancingReview/
downloads/05-06Winpg1.pdf.
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dimensions. A first key point of distinction is the division of governing responsibilities the programs create between the states
and the federal government. Medicare is exclusively federally
run and administered, while Medicaid is a classic cooperativefederalism program,23 jointly administered between the federal
government and the states. 24 States are statutorily empowered
to seek waivers to Medicaid’s general framework, allowing them
to expand coverage to new populations 25 or to experiment with
new delivery systems. 26 As such, although the broad strokes of
the program remain consistent across states, every state’s program differs in the details of its implementation. 27
The programs also differ in terms of the populations they
cover. Medicare was designed to cover essentially all Americans
beginning when they reach the age of sixty-five.28 By contrast,
Medicaid was initially conceived of as providing health insurance to the “deserving poor,” 29 including children, pregnant

23. Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The Submerged Constitution of American Healthcare, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 224 (2012).
24. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation:
State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE
L.J. 534, 562, 577 (2011).
25. Id. at 563.
26. See Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-43, tit. I, § 122,
tit. XI, § 1115, 76 Stat. 172, 192 (1962) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1315
(1988)) (providing for experimental project waivers).
27. Policy Basics: Introduction to Medicaid, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/policy-basics-introduction-to
-medicaid (last visited June 18, 2018) (“Because the federal guidelines are
broad, states have a great deal of flexibility in designing and administering their
programs. As a result, Medicaid eligibility and benefits can and often do vary
widely from state to state.”).
28. For background on the original design and implementation of Medicare,
see PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 368–
70 (1982).
29. David Orentlicher, Medicaid at 50: No Longer Limited to the “Deserving” Poor?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 185, 185–86 (2015). See
STARR, supra note 28, at 372–74 (describing the impetus for creating access to
health care for the poor).
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women, parents of minor children, the elderly,30 and disabled individuals.31 The ACA attempted to impose a mandatory Medicaid expansion that would have covered everyone below 138% of
the poverty line, 32 but the Supreme Court effectively held that
the Medicaid expansion must be optional for states. 33 At present,
thirty-three states have opted into the expansion, 34 meaning
that in many states, nondisabled, childless adults still have little
or no Medicaid coverage.35
30. Seniors whose income and assets are sufficiently low qualify for both
Medicare and Medicaid. There are nearly ten million of these “dual eligibles.”
KATHERINE YOUNG ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR DUAL
ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES 1 (2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files
.wordpress.com/2013/08/7846-04-medicaids-role-for-dual-eligible-beneficiaries
.pdf.
31. Nicole Huberfeld, The Universality of Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 67, 70 (2015).
32. See Affordable Care Act Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www
.medicaid.gov/affordable-care-act/eligibility/index.html (last visited June 18,
2018) (stating that the eligibility for Medicaid under the ACA is expanded to
individuals with incomes up to 133% of the poverty line); Medicaid Expansion
& What it Means for You, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/
medicaid-chip/medicaid-expansion-and-you (last visited June 18, 2018) (pointing out that in most cases the calculation of income results in a 138% threshold).
33. See Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012). The
Court held that although the Secretary of Health and Human Services could not
constitutionally condition existing Medicaid funds on a state’s failure to expand
Medicaid, she could offer additional funds to states choosing to expand Medicaid. Id.; see also Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 83, 108 (2012) (“[States] do not have an obligation to expand their Medicaid programs . . . .”).
34. Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., http://www.kff.org/health-reform/slide/current-status-of-the-medicaid
-expansion-decision (last updated Apr. 5, 2018). In the November 2017 elections,
the citizens of Maine voted to expand Medicaid, but as of this writing, their
recalcitrant governor has refused to do so. Abby Goodnough, Maine Voters Approve Medicaid Expansion, a Rebuke of Governor LePage, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/us/maine-medicaid-healthcare
.html; Kevin Miller, Groups Press LePage To File Medicaid Expansion Plan as
Time Runs Out, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www
.pressherald.com/2018/04/03/maine-hits-the-federal-deadline-for-medicaid
-expansion-plan.
35. As with the original passage of the Medicaid statute, however, this process is likely to take some time. The last state to join Medicaid the first time,
Arizona, did so seventeen years after the law’s passage. Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 445 n.69 (2011). See generally
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF HOW STATES HAVE RESPONDED TO THE AVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL FUNDS FOR HEALTH COVERAGE 2–
6 (Aug. 2012), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8349
.pdf (describing the varying Medicaid implementation timelines for different
states and examining the effect of federal funds on states’ decisions).
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Within Medicare, prescription drugs are primarily covered
under two different sections of the program: Part B and Part D.
Medicare Part B primarily covers physician services in the outpatient setting, 36 but in doing so it also covers prescription drugs
that are administered in doctors’ offices and outpatient settings.37 These drugs—typically large biologics used for the treatment of conditions like cancer,38 arthritis, 39 or macular degeneration 40—can cost thousands of dollars per dose, with many doses
needed over the course of a year. 41 Part B spending on drugs totaled nearly twenty-five billion dollars in 2015, 42 and half or
more of this total comes from anticancer drugs. 43
Part B coverage of prescription drugs is governed chiefly by
the same standard that governs coverage of services under that
program: whatever is “reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury.” 44 However, “reasonable and

36. 42 U.S.C. § 1395k(a)(2) (2012).
37. Id. § 1395u(o)(1).
38. In 2015, Part B spent $1.25 billion on pegfilgrastim, a drug used in conjunction with chemotherapeutic agents to stimulate the production of white
blood cells. Medicare Drug Spending Dashboard 2015, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Dashboard/2015-Medicare-Drug-Spending/
medicare-drug-spending-dashboard-2015-data.html (last visited June 18,
2018); Pegfilgrastim, NAT’L CANCER INST. (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.cancer
.gov/about-cancer/treatment/drugs/pegfilgrastim.
39. In 2015, Part B spent $1.24 billion on infliximab, a drug used to treat
rheumatoid arthritis and other autoimmune conditions. Infliximab (by Injection), NAT’L LIBR. MED., https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/
PMHT0010708 (last visited June 18, 2018); Medicare Drug Spending Dashboard 2015, supra note 38.
40. In 2015, Part B spent $1.8 billion on aflibercept, a drug used to treat
age-related macular degeneration and other related conditions. Aflibercept Injection, NAT’L LIBR. MED.: MEDLINE PLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/druginfo/
meds/a612004.html (last updated Feb. 15, 2017); Medicare Drug Spending
Dashboard 2015, supra note 38.
41. See, e.g., Tracy Staton, Eylea May Beat Lucentis on Price, but What of
Avastin?, FIERCEPHARMA (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.fiercepharma.com/
pharma/eylea-may-beat-lucentis-on-price-but-what-of-avastin (describing perdose costs of $1850 to $2000 and yearly treatments ranging from $16,000 to
$24,000).
42. The twenty-five billion dollar figure was calculated using data provided
by CMS. Medicare Drug Spending Dashboard 2015, supra note 38.
43. MEDPAC, supra note 4 (“In 2014, Medicare spending for anticancer
drugs accounted for about 55 percent of the nearly $21 billion spent on Part B
drugs . . . .”).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2012).
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necessary” is not defined by the statute or regulations, 45 and as
such CMS has set up extensive coverage-determination procedures.46 In practice, Part B drug coverage is quite broad and is
limited primarily by the structure of the program. That is, Part
B coverage is restricted to drugs which are not self-administered
and are provided in the course of a physician’s service. 47 But Part
B cannot decline to cover an effective FDA-approved drug simply
because it is expensive,48 and the Part B payment system is even
structured to encourage physicians to prescribe more expensive
products. 49
Although the broader Medicare program has existed since
1965, Medicare did not provide a standard pharmacy benefit
plan to seniors until 2003, 50 when Medicare Part D was created.51 Total expenditures on drugs under the Part D program
are much higher than under Part B, with 2015 spending under
the program exceeding $135 billion.52 The drugs with the highest
expenditures under the Part D program tell a slightly different
story than the drugs with the highest expenditures under Part
B. To be sure, the expensive multiple-myeloma drug Revlimid
cost Part D just over two billion dollars in 2015, for the treatment

45. See Isaac D. Buck, Furthering the Fiduciary Metaphor: The Duty of Providers to the Payers of Medicare, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1043, 1068–69 (2016); Peter
J. Neumann & James D. Chambers, Medicare’s Enduring Struggle to Define
“Reasonable and Necessary” Care, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1775, 1775–76 (2012).
46. See Medicare Coverage Determination Process, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/Determination
Process/index.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2018). See generally Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Coverage Decision-Making and Appeal Procedures: Can Process
Meet the Challenge of New Medical Technology?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461,
1471–89 (2003) (describing Part B coverage determination and appeals processes).
47. MEDPAC, supra note 4, at 121.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A).
49. MEDPAC, supra note 4, at 118, 127. See infra text accompanying notes
244–48 for a fuller explanation of this point.
50. See JANET LUNDY, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG
TRENDS 5 (2010) (“[A]bout one-quarter (27%) of seniors age 65 and older, and
one-third of poor (34%) and near-poor (33%) seniors, had no drug coverage in
2003 [when Congress passed Part D].”); see also Dana Gelb Safran et al., Prescription Drug Coverage and Seniors: Findings from a 2003 National Survey,
HEALTH AFF. (Web Exclusive) (Apr. 19, 2005).
51. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 21,
26, and 42 U.S.C.).
52. Medicare Drug Spending Dashboard 2015, supra note 38 (using the
Part D spreadsheet to calculate).
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of roughly 30,000 beneficiaries.53 But the program also spent
nearly $2.9 billion providing Crestor, a high cholesterol drug, to
more than 1.7 million beneficiaries, at a much lower cost per patient.54
Part D’s coverage requirements are specified quite clearly in
both statute and regulation. By law, plans must cover at least
two FDA-approved 55 drugs per therapeutic class, 56 although
plans generally cover more than two. 57 And for six classes of
drugs—anticonvulsants, antidepressants, antineoplastics (cancer drugs), antipsychotics, antiretrovirals (for the treatment of
HIV/AIDS), and immunosuppressants (for the treatment of
transplant rejection) Medicare must cover essentially all FDAapproved drugs. 58 There are two primary reasons for the protection of these six classes. First, CMS wanted to prevent discrimination against beneficiaries with these conditions, as might be
expected for patients with high-cost preexisting conditions. 59
Second, CMS aimed to “mitigate the risks and complications associated with an interruption of therapy for these vulnerable
populations.” 60
Medicaid’s system of prescription drug coverage is somewhat simpler. The federal government does not require that
state Medicaid programs cover outpatient prescription drugs,

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 42 C.F.R. § 423.100 (2017) defines “Part D drug” for the purposes of the
program by reference to Social Security Act section 1927(k)(2)(A), the Medicaid
statute, which is linked to drugs approved under the FDA statute. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396r-8(c)(1)(C)(i) (2012) (referencing section 505(c) of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (2012)).
56. 42 C.F.R. § 423.120(b)(2)(i).
57. NAT’L COUNCIL ON AGING, MEDICARE PART D DRUG PLANS: WHAT THEY
MUST, MAY, AND CANNOT COVER 1 (2017), https://www.ncoa.org/resources/
medicare-part-d-plans-what-they-must-can-cannot-cover.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(G)(iv).
59. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S.DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT MANUAL ch. 16,
§ 30.2.5 (2016) [hereinafter MEDICARE MANUAL], https://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/
Downloads/Part-D-Benefits-Manual-Chapter-6.pdf; see also Douglas B. Jacobs
& Benjamin D. Sommers, Using Drugs to Discriminate—Adverse Selection in
the Insurance Marketplace, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 399, 400 (2015) (describing
how some insurers structure prescription drug benefits to deter high-cost patients from enrolling in their plans).
60. MEDICARE MANUAL, supra note 59.
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but all states have chosen to do so. 61 That choice comes with a
set of coverage obligations. States must cover all FDA-approved
drugs with a few classes of exceptions,62 such as drugs used for
cosmetic purposes. 63 To be sure, Medicaid programs are permitted to use formulary management tools like prior authorization
or step therapy to steer patients toward less-expensive products,
at least at first. 64 But where these tools are used in a way that
goes beyond treatment guidelines, patients have sued and obtained access to rationed products. 65
Medicaid’s coverage requirements come with preferred-pricing benefits for the states. By law, pharmaceutical companies
must remit to Medicaid a rebate for each unit of a drug they sell
to the program, and these rebates can be quite substantial. Innovator drug companies must remit at least 23.1% of a drug’s
Average Manufacturer Price (AMP), 66 and states are empowered
to seek additional rebates on top of that. 67 If the company offers
an even bigger discount to another payer, Medicaid is entitled by
law to that “best price” provided to another entity for the drug. 68
Medicaid is also insulated from price increases in existing drugs
that outpace the inflation rate, 69 and more than half of Medicaid
rebates are estimated to be due to this provision. 70

61. JULIA PARADISE, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID MOVING FOR4 (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/medicaid
-moving-forward.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(2).
63. See id. § 1396r-8(d)(2)(C); see also id. § 1396r-8(d)(2).
64. Id. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(A), (d)(4).
65. E.g., Ed Silverman, Washington State Told To Lift Restrictions on Hepatitis C Medicines, STAT (May 27, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/
2016/05/27/washington-state-hepatitis-drug-prices; Joseph Walker, Arkansas
Reaches Settlement in Cystic Fibrosis Drug Suit, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/arkansas-reaches-settlement-in-cystic-fibrosis
-drug-suit-1423162197.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(B)(i)(VI); see also Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2503(a)(2), 124 Stat. 310 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(1)(A)) (redefining AMP).
67. Generic companies must remit thirteen percent of the AMP per unit. 42
U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(3)(B)(iii).
68. Id. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I). There are some exceptions to this. Prices
paid by Medicare Part D plans or the Veterans Administration, for instance, are
excluded. Id. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(C)(i).
69. Id. § 1396r-8(c)(2)(A).
70. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
OEI-03-13-00650, MEDICAID REBATES FOR BRAND-NAME DRUGS EXCEEDED
PART D REBATES BY A SUBSTANTIAL MARGIN 8 (2015).

WARD
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Importantly, Medicaid coverage seems to be required regardless of the FDA pathway the drug in question takes to approval. Before 1992, drugs approved by the FDA took a fairly
standard path to approval, proceeding through three phases of
clinical trials designed to demonstrate safety and efficacy. 71 Although many innovators still make use of this traditional pathway today, more and more innovator companies are taking advantage of a set of expedited development programs to speed
their path to market.72
Some of these programs offer primarily procedural benefits.
For example, the Fast Track and Breakthrough Therapy Designations give qualifying sponsors more opportunities to meet and
work with FDA officials in ways that ensure trials are designed
efficiently and carefully from the beginning. 73 However, the Accelerated Approval program is more substantive. It permits
sponsors to obtain FDA approval on the basis of a surrogate endpoint or an intermediate clinical endpoint that is reasonably
likely to predict the drug’s clinical benefit. 74 This program is intended to address unmet medical needs “for a serious or lifethreatening disease or condition.”75 In theory, drugs approved
under this program are subject to required postapproval clinical
trials, to confirm and support their effectiveness. 76 However, too
often these trials are not completed. 77
Drugs approved under the Accelerated Approval program
are not subject to the same standards before FDA approval as

71. PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 628 (3d ed. 2007).
72. Martin Kwok et al., Expedited Programs for Serious Conditions: An Update on Breakthrough Therapy Designation, 37 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 2104,
2104 (2015).
73. See 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)–(b) (2012); see also FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS—DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS 7–8 (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/
UCM358301.pdf (comparing FDA programs for expediting drug approval).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 151–55 for a more in-depth discussion of surrogate endpoints.
75. 21 U.S.C. § 356(c)(1)(A).
76. Huseyin Naci et al., Characteristics of Preapproval and Postapproval
Studies for Drugs Granted Accelerated Approval by the US Food and Drug Administration, 318 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 626, 627 (2017).
77. Id. at 634 (noting that of twenty-four indications approved under the
Accelerated Approval program, five years after approval eight indications still
had not fulfilled their postmarket requirements).
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drugs subjected to the standard three-phase clinical trial process.78 As such, there may be a question about whether Medicaid
should be legally required to cover them, if coverage is viewed as
a reward for successful completion of the thorough FDA review
process. The FDA has taken the position that “because drugs approved under the accelerated approval process meet the statutory standards for safety and effectiveness, they would be eligible for reimbursement under State Medicaid programs or other
third-party plans.” 79 It is not clear why this would be the FDA’s
interpretive decision to make (rather than CMS’s decision), but
to date, it does not appear that CMS has formally advanced a
contrary position.80
B. PRIVATE PAYERS
The statutes and regulations governing coverage through
private payers are more complex. Private insurance is also regulated at the state level, and there are often state-level coverage
mandates for particular conditions. For instance, forty-two
states require payers to cover all FDA-approved cancer therapies. 81 Forty-six states have laws mandating diabetes coverage,
including at least a subset of relevant medications. 82
Private plans that are marketed under the ACA are jointly
regulated at the federal and state level. 83 Federal regulations require plans sold in the individual and small-group insurance
markets to cover ten essential health benefits, one of which is

78. New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations, Accelerated Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942, 58,942 (Dec. 11, 1992) (codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601).
79. Id. at 58,945.
80. A 2015 presentation from the Executive Director of the National Association of Medicaid Directors seemed to confirm this view, noting that Medicaid
currently “requires coverage regardless of approval pathway.” Matt Salo, HighCost Drugs: Impacts on the Medicaid Program at slide 7 (Apr. 9, 2015), http://
www.csrxp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/CSRxP-Congressional-briefing8
.pdf.
81. Lee N. Newcomer, Those Who Pay Have a Say: A View on Oncology Drug
Pricing and Reimbursement, 21 ONCOLOGIST 779, 779 (2016).
82. Although the states differed as to how many medication options they
provided to patients, they all offered coverage of at least a dozen brand-name
drugs. Diabetes Pharmaceuticals State Mandates, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/diabetes
-pharmaceuticals-state-mandates.aspx.
83. See David Blumenthal & Sara R. Collins, Health Care Coverage Under
the Affordable Care Act—A Progress Report, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 275, 281
(2014).
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prescription drug coverage. 84 At a minimum, these plans must
cover at least one drug per therapeutic class.85 But, at present,
the federal government has delegated the choice of a minimum
benchmark plan to each state, 86 and these benchmark plans often require more expansive coverage.87
To the extent that private plans are legally required to cover
fewer drugs than Medicare or Medicaid are, they may have more
freedom to negotiate prices than do public payers. However, private payers’ ability to demand those discounts may be practically
limited. Medicaid’s statutory best-price rule requires that pharmaceutical companies providing large discounts to private payers extend those discounts to Medicaid as well. 88 For drugs
whose indications have a relatively high prevalence among the
Medicaid population, it is easy to imagine their manufacturers
limiting discounts to private payers to prevent triggering the
best-price rule.
Importantly, just because a payer is legally required to cover
a particular product does not mean it will be affordable to the
patient in question. Medicare and private payers often impose
significant out-of-pocket cost sharing, although Medicaid copayments are tightly regulated by the government. 89 Medicare Part
D enrollees may need to pay thousands of dollars out of pocket,
particularly for expensive specialty drugs. 90 And for the growing
proportion of privately ensured patients who are enrolled in a
84. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(F ) (2012).
85. 45 C.F.R. § 156.122(a)(1)(i) (2017).
86. See Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1716–17 (2016).
87. See Joshua P. Cohen et al., Complying With State and Federal Regulations on Essential Drug Benefits: Implementing the Affordable Care Act, 20 AM.
J. MANAGED CARE 153 (2014) (explaining how HHS implies broader coverage of
prescription drugs, as it would require state coverage of either at least one drug
in each therapeutic class, or the number of drugs that the benchmark plan offers, whichever is more); State Insurance Mandates and the ACA Essential Benefits Provisions, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 12, 2018), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-ins-mandates-and-aca-essential-benefits
.aspx#EHB_Rx (“ The benefits and services included in the benchmark health
insurance plan selected by the state would be the essential health benefits package. Plans could modify coverage within a benefit category so long as they do
not reduce the value of coverage.”).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(C).
89. Cost Sharing Out of Pocket Costs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. (2013), https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/cost-sharing/out-of-pocket
-costs/index.html (describing out-of-pocket costs imposed by states under Medicaid).
90. See supra note 5.
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high-deductible health plan, 91 they may similarly be exposed to
thousands of dollars in cost sharing before their insurance coverage kicks in. 92 These up-front costs may dissuade or prevent
patients from accessing even covered products. 93
II. LINKAGE AFFECTS POLICY CHOICES ABOUT BOTH
APPROVAL AND COVERAGE
The legal link between FDA approval and insurance reimbursement has implications for policy proposals in both areas.
This Part considers policy initiatives that scholars and policymakers have proposed on both sides of the issue and explains
how those initiatives would be affected by the legal relationship
between approval and reimbursement. In short, initiatives that
would alter the FDA’s approval process would likely have significant unintended consequences. And initiatives that would seek
to affect drug pricing and overall drug spending would be rendered toothless.
A. ALTERING THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS
Over the last several years, academics and policymakers
have proposed a number of initiatives that would permit or require the FDA to approve drugs on the basis of less (or less robust) evidence. Some of these proposals are quite extreme, such
as proposals to approve drugs on the basis of safety data alone,
rather than requiring proof of efficacy.94 Others are much more
91. See 2015 Employer Health Benefits Survey, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2015-summary-of
-findings (noting that in 2015, twenty-four percent of workers were enrolled in
a high-deductible plan, up from four percent in 2006).
92. See 2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey: High-Deductible Plans With
Savings Option, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.kff.org/
report-section/ehbs-2016-section-eight-high-deductible-health-plans-with
-savings-option.
93. See, e.g., ROBIN A. COHEN & MARIA A. VILLARROEL, STRATEGIES USED
BY ADULTS TO REDUCE THEIR PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS: UNITED STATES,
2013, NCHS DATA BRIEF 2 (Jan. 2015) (detailing strategies patients used to reduce prescription drug costs, including skipping doses or delaying filling a prescription). Professor Amy Monahan has looked closely at the ways in which ACA
plans have implemented the Act’s essential health benefit requirements, including for prescription drugs like those for the treatment of hepatitis C, in ways
that impose significant out-of-pocket costs on patients. See generally Amy B.
Monahan, Undermining the ACA: How the Regulatory Failure to Define Essential Health Benefits Allows Strategic Insurer Behavior, 44 AM. J.L. & MED.
(forthcoming 2018).
94. See, e.g., Joseph V. Gulfo, A Trumpian Cure for the FDA’s Chronic Lethargy, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-trumpian
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moderate, such as the provision in the 21st Century Cures Act
requiring the FDA to consider the potential use of “real-world
evidence,” rather than randomized, controlled trials, in the approval of secondary indications for existing drugs.95 Still others
lie in between, such as the proposed Reciprocity Ensures
Streamlined Use of Lifesaving Treatments (RESULT) Act, which
would require the FDA to speed review of drugs that are already
approved for marketing in a particular list of foreign countries. 96
Proponents of these and other initiatives argue that many
of the requirements the FDA imposes on manufacturers seeking
to bring new drugs to market are mere bureaucratic “red tape.” 97
In their view, if we could only tear down the barriers the FDA
imposes throughout the regulatory process, there would be enormous benefits to the system. Drug approvals would happen
much more quickly, 98 Americans would be able to access life-saving drugs and devices which are already available elsewhere, 99

-cure-for-the-fdas-chronic-lethargy-1479773883 (suggesting returning the FDA
to its original role of ensuring that approved drugs have demonstrated biological
activity in fighting a disease and can be labeled for safe use); Ed Silverman,
Trump Is Considering a Radical To Lead FDA, STAT (Dec. 12, 2016), https://
www.statnews.com/2016/12/12/donald-trump-fda-oneill
(describing
Jim
O’Neill’s views on approval of prescription drugs). Importantly, at some level
this proposal is incoherent. Safety cannot be assessed independently of efficacy.
The FDA review process assesses the safety of drugs only in comparison to their
efficacy for a particular indication. A safety profile that may be acceptable in
the context of a drug that is effective at treating late-stage cancer may be entirely unacceptable for a vaccine administered to an otherwise healthy individual. If a drug turns out to have high efficacy, more safety concerns might be
tolerated.
95. See 21st Century Cures Act, H.R. 34, 114th Cong. § 3022 (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 355g (2012)). The impact of this provision remains to be seen, as the
FDA Commissioner has not yet established a draft framework for considering
such evidence, as required by the Act. 21 U.S.C. § 355g(c)(1).
96. See RESULT Act, S. 2022, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Erika Lietzan,
Thoughts on “Reciprocal Marketing Approval,” OBJECTIVE INTENT (Nov. 3,
2017), https://objectiveintent.blog/2017/11/03/thoughts-on-reciprocal
-marketing-approval (describing why she calls the RESULT Act the “Send All
of the FDA Employees Home Act of 2017”).
97. Press Release, Senator Ted Cruz Press Office, Cruz, Lee Introduce the
RESULT Act (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_
release&id=2554; Gulfo, supra note 94.
98. Gulfo, supra note 94.
99. Senator Ted Cruz Press Office, supra note 97.
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and drug prices might even go down.100 The veracity of these predictions aside,101 this Section focuses on another effect of these
initiatives and others like them.
These initiatives would lead the FDA to approve more unsafe, ineffective drugs. Importantly, this is not meant pejoratively. It is meant as a statistical observation about the kind of
question the FDA must answer when it approves a drug. The
FDA must consider how to balance Type I and Type II errors in
the approval process. As a matter of policy, one option would be
for the FDA to focus on minimizing the number of unsafe or ineffective drugs that it approves (minimizing Type I errors). On
this view, the FDA should not put its stamp of approval on drugs
that harm patients or that do not work.102 Over time, too many
approvals of unsafe or ineffective drugs could erode public trust
in the FDA as a tool for consumer protection.103 More generally,
this is the entire reason the FDA possesses the legal authority
to screen pharmaceuticals for safety and efficacy. Scandals involving unsafe or ineffective drugs prompted Congress to give
the FDA more and greater powers over the years, in large part
to prevent such products coming to market in the first instance. 104
Alternatively, a second option would be for the FDA to focus
on minimizing the number of safe, effective drugs it fails to approve (minimizing Type II errors). 105 On this view, it is worse for

100. Gulfo, supra note 94.
101. The FDA already approves most drugs more quickly than its developed
world counterparts (Europe, Canada, and Japan), so the set of drugs to which
this applies is small. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Downing et al., Regulatory Review of
Novel Therapeutics—Comparison of Three Regulatory Agencies, 366 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2284, 2284 (2012); Matthieu Larochelle et al., Assessing the Potential
Clinical Impact of Reciprocal Drug Approval Legislation on Access to Novel
Therapeutics in the USA: A Cohort Study, 7 BMJ OPEN 1, 1 (2017).
102. See DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER 1–32 (2010) (describing the role of the FDA as gatekeeper ).
103. Id. at 11.
104. Id. at 73, 228 (detailing the elixir sulfanilamide and thalidomide tragedies and their contribution to the enactment of legislation giving the FDA new
powers).
105. Importantly, this is not truly an either or issue. It is consistent to require vaccines or other preventive interventions to undergo strict testing, as
they are administered to healthy people, and at the same time speed drugs to
market for deadly conditions where patients have no other treatment options.
As discussed in Part I, supra text accompanying notes 73–80, there are already
accelerated-approval systems in place to help accomplish this latter goal today,
systems which may account for a larger percentage of the unsafe, ineffective
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the FDA to deny patients access to a drug that is safe and effective than it is for the FDA to approve a drug that later is shown
to be unsafe or ineffective. This view might still permit the FDA
to screen out drugs with significant safety signals or reject drugs
with no plausible mechanism of action, and this view might require postmarket surveillance studies. However, in general, this
view holds that the FDA ought to be enabling sick patients to
access drugs more quickly. This view of the FDA’s role places
greater responsibility on insurers, physicians, and patients to
gather, process, and act on information about a drug’s safety and
efficacy.
Over the last few decades, the FDA has generally chosen to
err on the side of minimizing the number of unsafe, ineffective
drugs it approves (minimizing Type I errors). 106 Importantly, under this view the right number of approved unsafe, ineffective
drugs is still not zero. The FDA certainly makes mistakes, and
so although the “right” number in our current system is something small, it is not zero. These policy proposals envision a system in which the FDA approves many more drugs, the efficacy
of which has not yet been tested in the real world or has been
tested on a limited basis. They thus envision a system in which
the right number of approved unsafe, ineffective drugs is much
higher than it is right now, and certainly far higher than zero.
This position is entirely defensible. Proponents might argue
that Type II errors are more visible and therefore fixable, as approved drugs can be studied further to examine potential safety
signals, while unapproved drugs cannot be studied as easily. 107
When expressed publicly, however, defenders usually do not consider the full consequences the policy would create, precisely because of the link between FDA approval and insurance reimbursement. Insurers cannot easily sort out the efficacy of these
unproven drugs and they will have no ability to demand additional information from manufacturers because they cannot decline to cover the drugs, even though their efficacy has not been
demonstrated.
drugs approved at present. See Jonathan J. Darrow et al., New FDA Breakthrough-Drug Category—Implications for Patients, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1252,
1253–54 (2014).
106. See Montazerhodjat & Lo, supra note 2, at 3. (“[T]he current standards
of drug-approval are weighted more on avoiding a Type I error (approving ineffective therapies) rather than a Type II error (rejecting effective therapies).”).
107. It is possible that drugs erroneously denied approval by the FDA applying strict safety and efficacy standards might be approved in other countries,
providing opportunities for such study.
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As a result, not only would these proposals lead to the approval of more unsafe, ineffective drugs—but Medicare and Medicaid would be required by law to cover nearly all of them. The
idea that these proposals will somehow decrease drug spending
is, therefore, difficult to understand. Reform of the FDA approval
system without accompanying reform to insurance reimbursement would likely increase spending, not decrease it. 108
B. CURBING DRUG PRICES AND SPENDING THROUGH MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID
Similarly, policy proposals aiming to control drug prices and
spending through government-run insurance programs overlook
the linked nature of approval and reimbursement and would
therefore not have the desired policy impact. On the Medicare
side, the idea that permitting Medicare to negotiate drug prices
will significantly reduce costs has captivated policymakers on
both sides of the aisle. 109 And within the Medicaid program,
some policymakers have contended that per-capita caps or other
efforts to limit Medicaid spending will enable states to save on
drug spending.110 Neither of these arguments standing alone is
accurate.
Policy arguments about permitting Medicare to negotiate
for lower drug prices have their origin in a provision of the law
establishing the Medicare Part D program that prohibits such
conduct. Often referred to as the noninterference clause, the
statute provides that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) “may not interfere with the negotiations between
drug manufacturers and pharmacies and [Prescription Drug
Plan] sponsors” and “may not require a particular formulary or
institute a price structure for the reimbursement of covered part
108. This is somewhat of a perverse result, as those proposing such initiatives (like Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Mike Lee (R-UT), sponsors of the RESULT Act) typically favor less federal spending on health care, rather than
more.
109. See Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, Searching for Savings in Medicare Drug Price Negotiations, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 2017), http://
files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-searching-for-savings-in-medicare-drug
-price-negotiations (“In response to higher drug spending growth and heightened attention to drug prices, some policymakers have proposed allowing Medicare to negotiate the price of prescription drugs—a proposal supported by 82
percent of the public, including a majority of Democrats (93%), Republicans
(68%), and Independents (85%).”).
110. See, e.g., Salvador Rizzo, MacArthur Faces the Wrath of New Jersey,
OBSERVER (May 11, 2017), http://observer.com/2017/05/macarthur-faces-the
-wrath-of-new-jersey.
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D drugs.” 111 Essentially, this section prohibits HHS from negotiating or setting prices in Medicare Part D. 112 The policy argument is therefore simple: if we permitted Medicare to negotiate
on behalf of its fifty million enrollees,113 it would be able to negotiate deeper discounts than the program is currently able to
demand. President Obama continually proposed to repeal the
noninterference clause at least in part in his proposed budgets, 114 and President Trump has suggested he would like to implement this policy as well. 115
However, these arguments either do not appreciate or willfully ignore the Medicare coverage requirements set out in Part
I—requirements which severely limit the program’s bargaining
power. Medicare might be able to achieve some savings where
there is already market competition and where Medicare is permitted to cover two drugs in that class, although it is difficult to
see why private plans have not negotiated such deals already.
But for the six protected classes in which Medicare must cover
all products, or for expensive new drugs with few, if any, substitutes, Medicare cannot walk away from the table if it does not
like the deal companies are offering. This is why the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that providing Medicare
with negotiating authority by itself “would have a negligible effect on Medicare drug spending.” 116
Importantly, negotiation authority could be coupled with
other powers that would have such an impact. The CBO suggests
that the “authority to establish a formulary” 117 is one such
power. In other words, if Medicare was permitted to decline to
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111(i) (2012).
112. Importantly, this section does not apply to private entities who design
and administer Part D plans. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COMPETITION AND THE
COST OF MEDICARE’S PRESCRIPTION DRUG PROGRAM 25 (2014). They do negotiate prices, although their patient populations may be small relative to the pool
of Medicare enrollees more generally. The idea is that Medicare, negotiating on
behalf of all of its enrollees, would be able to leverage more bargaining power.
113. Total Number of Medicare Beneficiaries (2015), KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/medicare/state-indicator/total-medicare-beneficiaries (last
visited June 18, 2018).
114. Cubanski & Neuman, supra note 109.
115. See Alison Kodjak, Medicare Should Leverage Buying Power to Pull
Down Drug Prices, White House Says, NPR (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.npr
.org/sections/health-shots/2017/02/07/513945538/white-house-says-medicare
-should-leverage-its-buying-power-to-pull-down-drug-pri.
116. Letter from Peter R. Orszag, Director, Cong. Budget Office, to Ron Wyden, Senator 2 (Apr. 10, 2007), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/79xx/doc7992/drugpricenegotiation.pdf.
117. Id.
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cover a product when a pharmaceutical company refuses to deal
fairly with Medicare in negotiations, it might be able to achieve
savings.118 Of course, this would mean delinking FDA approval
and insurance reimbursement, potentially depriving at least
some patients of access to drugs that would otherwise have been
available to them.
A similar argument has been made in the context of the
Medicaid program. Since its creation, Medicaid has been structured as an open-ended entitlement program. If states enroll
more people in the program or provide them with more benefits
in a particular year, the federal government will continue to pay
for its share of the program. Particularly during economic downturns, when more individuals may lose their jobs and become eligible for Medicaid, the program expands to meet their needs. 119
More recently, a number of Republican legislators have proposed funding Medicaid through finite block grants or per-capita
caps, which would provide the states each year with either a
fixed pot of money or a pot of money that is fixed on a per-enrollee basis. 120 The buzzword here is flexibility. 121 The thinking is
that states faced more explicitly with finite resources will make
more efficient choices about how to allocate their funding, perhaps cutting wasteful services or cutting rates on particular

118. This is not the only way to achieve such savings. The CBO also suggests
that prices may simply be set administratively. Id. Scholars have suggested using binding arbitration as another option. See, e.g., Richard G. Frank & Joseph
P. Newhouse, Should Drug Prices Be Negotiated Under Part D of Medicare? And
If So, How?, 27 HEALTH AFF. 33, 39–41 (2008) (discussing possible methods for
setting drug prices, including arbitration).
119. David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal
Volatility Problem, 98 CAL. L. REV. 749, 760 (2010) (“[M]ore state residents generally qualify for Medicaid during downturns . . . .”); Benjamin D. Sommers &
Arnold M. Epstein, Why States Are So Miffed About Medicaid—Economics, Politics, and the “Woodwork Effect,” 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 100, 100 (2011).
120. See, e.g., American Health Care Act (AHCA) of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th
Cong. § 121; Better Care Reconciliation Act (BCRA) of 2017, Senate Amendment to H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. § 133.
121. See, e.g., Eugene Scott, Burgess Defends GOP Health Care Bill, CNN
(May 4, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/04/politics/michael-burgess-health
-care-bill-cnntv/index.html (quoting Representative Burgess saying state governors have asked Congress for flexibility); Bruce Westerman, Medicaid Block
Grants Give States More Freedom, THE HILL (Mar. 21, 2017), http://thehill.com/
blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/325097-medicaid-block-grants-give-states
-more-freedom.
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products or services. 122 Legislators have suggested that such
caps would permit states to achieve savings on drug costs. 123
It is difficult to see why this would be so. If Medicaid is required by law to cover essentially all FDA-approved drugs, it
lacks the bargaining power to demand better prices on particular
products. Perhaps some states would increase their use of step
therapy or prior-authorization tactics and achieve some savings.
But as states have been employing these efforts for decades, it is
difficult to imagine they could achieve more than a marginal additional level of savings through these techniques. 124 Where proposed caps would cut Medicaid funding levels by twenty-five percent or more over the next decade, 125 no program can absorb such
cuts through incremental gains.
Since prescription drugs are an optional category of coverage for Medicaid, states could decline to cover them entirely, 126
although that would be an extreme solution. More likely, states
would pressure Congress to permit them to set formularies in
Medicaid, using partial delinkage to create bargaining power,
but also limiting access to such drugs.127
The link between FDA approval and insurance reimbursement is also the reason a number of state-level ballot initiatives
attempting to control drug costs would be ineffective. California
and Ohio have considered (and ultimately rejected) ballot initiatives that propose to cap what drug manufacturers can charge to
public payers in the state (including Medicaid) at the price paid

122. Aaron E. Carroll, How Would Republican Plans for Medicaid Block
Grants Actually Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/06/upshot/how-would-republican-plans-for-medicaid-block-grants
-actually-work.html.
123. Rizzo, supra note 110 (quoting Representative Tom MacArthur that Republican proposals would help drive down drug prices).
124. But see David Dranove et al., A Dose of Managed Care: Controlling Drug
Spending in Medicaid 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
23956, 2017) (finding privatization of state Medicaid drug programs greatly reduced costs).
125. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LONGER-TERM EFFECTS OF THE BETTER CARE
RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2017 ON MEDICAID SPENDING 1 (2017) (concluding that
BCRA would lower Medicaid spending by twenty-six percent in 2026, a number
which would increase to thirty-five percent by 2036).
126. See Peter R. Orszag, One Nightmare Scenario in Senate Bill: Drug Rationing, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 28, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/
articles/2017-06-28/one-nightmare-scenario-in-senate-bill-drug-rationing (discussing how states may need to ration drug access to control costs).
127. Id.
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by the VA. 128 But the VA is permitted to establish drug formularies and decline to cover drugs that are too expensive. 129 State
Medicaid programs are legally obligated to cover the relevant
products and so do not clearly have the bargaining power to demand that they pay the same prices as the VA. The VA can get
up and walk away from the table—Medicaid cannot. 130
III. HYPOTHESIZING DELINKAGE
If academics and policymakers would like to implement policy changes of the type described in Part II but are unable to do
so because of the link between these policy proposals and required drug coverage,131 one possibility is to delink the programs. It is important to consider both the positive and negative
potential implications if approval and reimbursement were delinked. This Part considers three main policy consequences that
might be expected to result from delinkage, although their precise reach undoubtedly depends on the scope of revisions made
to existing law and the relative sizes of the markets at issue.
A. REDUCING ACCESS TO MEDICINES
The first and potentially most important consequence that
might result from delinkage is a reduction in access to certain
medicines. The concern is that if insurers (especially Medicare
and Medicaid) are no longer legally required to cover certain
drugs, they will no longer choose to. Whether this result is of real
social concern depends on how valuable these excluded drugs are
128. Renee Hickman, Ohio Takes Drug Price Measure to Voting Booth,
BLOOMBERG BNA (July 19, 2017), https://www.bna.com/ohio-takes-drug
-n73014461943.
129. Austin B. Frakt et al., Should Medicare Adopt the Veterans Health Administration Formulary?, 21 HEALTH ECON. 485, 487 (2012).
130. There is also a first-order barrier to the implementation of these initiatives. Capping state prices at VA prices seems to require the state to know what
the VA is paying for a drug. However, the prices paid by the VA are generally
not public. See Mike McCaughan et al., Health Policy Brief: Veterans Health
Administration, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs
.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171008.000174/full. Nothing in either state initiative requires pharmaceutical companies to disclose these prices to the relevant state
actors, and it is not clear that the states would have the ability to access the
information otherwise.
131. The sense in which policymakers would be unable to implement these
changes is different for the two sets of reforms. In the case of policymakers who
seek to speed the FDA approval process, they may or may not seek to limit public spending on these newly approved drugs. In the case of policymakers who
seek to enable Medicare to use more market-based tools to control prices, those
initiatives will not be possible without delinkage.
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to individual patients. Although it is difficult to specify with certainty what insurers might do in such a case, we can glean some
potential concerning outcomes from existing insurer efforts to
exclude drugs from coverage.
First, expensive orphan drugs are likely to be a target for
exclusion, even where only a small number of patients rely on
them. 132 Consider the case of Kalydeco, a drug approved for the
treatment of cystic fibrosis in a subset of patients with a particular genetic mutation. 133 Kalydeco may significantly improve
the disease’s symptoms in that small group of patients, but its
list price is over $300,000 per patient per year 134—for a drug that
patients may take for their entire lives. Although Medicaid programs are entitled to significant discounts off of this list price, 135
it is easy to see how state budgets can be strained by a few patients needing expensive drugs like this one.
After Kalydeco’s approval, many state Medicaid programs
aimed to limit the patients who could obtain the drug beyond the
genetic limitations already imposed by the FDA. For instance,
the programs required patients to demonstrate first that they
had failed to respond to older, less expensive therapies. Patients
objected, and three patients even sued Arkansas for denying
them access to Kalydeco. 136 The parties settled the case, with
Arkansas changing its eligibility criteria for Kalydeco. 137 But we

132. As defined by the Orphan Drug Act, these are drugs approved for the
treatment of a disease or condition which “affects less than 200,000 persons in
the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2012).
133. FDA, PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: KALYDECO 2 (Feb. 2017), https://
www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2017/203188s022l_
207925s003lbl.pdf (listing the mutations patients may have for which Kalydeco
is approved).
134. See Matthew Herper, For Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Can One Billion-Dollar Breakthrough Beget Another?, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/matthewherper/2017/08/08/vertex-pharmaceuticals-and-the-price-of
-inspiration.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(B)(i)(VI) (2012) (setting the “minimum rebate
percentage” for rebate periods after December 31, 2009 at 23.1%).
136. Arkansas has said that “[c]ost alone was not the determining factor ” in
imposing these restrictions on Kalydeco. But internal state emails showed that
state officials expressed concern about the cost. See Joseph Walker, Costly Vertex Drug Is Denied, and Medicaid Patients Sue, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2014),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/costly-drug-vertex-is-denied-and-medicaid
-patients-sue-1405564205.
137. Arkansas had actually changed its eligibility criteria for Kalydeco after
the initiation of the lawsuit but before the settlement occurred, and they technically agreed to maintain those new eligibility criteria. Walker, supra note 65.
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might expect states to exclude these drugs going forward if coverage is not required. 138
Second, payers might balk at covering even less-expensive
cures, if the aggregate budgetary impact is sufficiently high. The
recently developed hepatitis C cures are the primary example
here. The first of these drugs to be approved, Sovaldi, retailed
for $84,000 per course. 139 Although the drug cures hepatitis C in
the vast majority of patients, making the drug a one-time expenditure rather than a chronic expense, states could not afford
to provide the drug to all of their hepatitis C patients enrolled in
Medicaid. 140 Medicare experienced a similar spike in spending
once the drugs were introduced. 141
Most state Medicaid programs initially restricted access to
these drugs beyond what was deemed medically necessary. For
instance, many states required patients to demonstrate particularly severe levels of liver disease or to demonstrate their abstinence from the use of illegal substances for particular periods of
time before providing access to the medications. 142
As in the case of Kalydeco, these restrictions were met with
lawsuits or demand letters in a number of states, 143 with the
138. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas J. Betlach, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Medicaid Dirs. (NAMD), & John B. McCarthy, Vice President, NAMD, to Fred Upton, Representative & Frank Pallone, Representative 2 (Apr. 8, 2015), http://
www.medicaiddirectors.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/namd_letter_to_
congress_21st_century_cures.pdf.
139. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI. ENG’G & MED., A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE
ELIMINATION OF HEPATITIS B AND C: PHASE TWO REPORT 151 (Gillian J. Buckley & Brian L. Strom eds., 2017). Again, importantly, state Medicaid programs
were able to obtain these drugs at significant discounts, especially once competition was introduced into the market with the approval of Viekira Pak months
later. See id. at 165.
140. See Joshua Sharfstein et al., We Have a Cure for Hepatitis C. but the
Neediest Can’t Afford It. Louisiana Wants to Change That., VOX (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/9/27/16350562/hepatitis-c-drug
-prices-louisiana.
141. Charles Ornstein, New Hepatitis C Drugs Are Costing Medicare Billions, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/medicare-spent-45-billion-on-new-hepatitis-c-drugs-last-year
-data-shows/2015/03/29/66952dde-d32a-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html.
142. See CTR. FOR HEALTH LAW & POLICY INNOVATION, HEPATITIS C: THE
STATE OF MEDICAID ACCESS 5–9 (2016).
143. See, e.g., JoNel Aleccia, Lawsuit Targets Medicaid Policy that Limits
Spendy Hepatitis C Drugs, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www
.seattletimes.com/news//lawsuit-targets-medicaid-policy-that-limits-spendy
-hep-c-drugs; ACLU Files Class Action Lawsuit Against Colorado Medicaid over
Unlawful Hepatitis C Treatment Restrictions, ACLU COLO. (Sept. 19, 2016),
https://aclu-co.org/aclu-files-class-action-lawsuit-colorado-medicaid-unlawful
-hepatitis-c-treatment-restrictions; Jen Rini, State Changes Hep C Medication
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cases resolved in the patients’ favor. 144 Drugs like these may also
be excluded, or at least significantly limited, if coverage is not
required.
Finally, in the private-insurance market, we may expect
companies to engage in business practices designed to attract
healthy, low-cost individuals to their plans and discourage
sicker, high-cost individuals from enrolling. This practice, referred to as “cream skimming,” has been known in the literature
for decades. 145 The ACA made it more difficult for insurers to
engage in these practices, through the essential health benefits
requirement and the nondiscrimination provisions of the Act.146
But discrimination has persisted. Recent lawsuits alleged
that insurance companies were discriminating against patients
with HIV/AIDS in an effort to discourage the patients from signing up for their plans. Specifically, the insurers would place most
of the drugs needed for this condition in the highest cost-sharing
tier, requiring patients to pay far more out of pocket for their
treatment. 147 Alternatively, they would decline to cover a sufficient number of drugs within each category, preventing physicians from providing their patients with the most effective treatment options. 148 Practices like these would likely increase if
coverage were not required on nondiscriminatory terms.
Importantly, in none of these three cases is there a question
about whether the drugs are effective. There may be questions
about whether the efficacy produced by these drugs is worth
their price, but in each case, there is clear evidence to support
the use of these drugs in at least some patient populations. 149 As
Guidelines, Avoids Lawsuit, NEWS JOURNAL (June 7, 2016), https://www
.delawareonline.com/story/news/health/2016/06/07/state-changes-hep-c
-medication-guidelines-avoids-lawsuit/85554396.
144. See, e.g., JoNel Aleccia, Judge Orders Washington Medicaid To Provide
Lifesaving Hepatitis C Drugs for All, SEATTLE TIMES (May 28, 2016), https://
www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/health/judge-orders-apple-health-to-cover
-hepatitis-c-drugs-for-all.
145. See, e.g., Joseph P. Newhouse, Cream Skimming, Asymmetric Information, and a Competitive Insurance Market, 3 J. HEALTH ECON. 97, 97 (1984).
146. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012).
147. Michelle Andrews, Seven Insurers Alleged to Have Discriminated
Against HIV Patients, NPR (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/health
-shots/2016/10/18/498427561/7-insurers-alleged-to-have-discrimated-against
-hiv-patients.
148. See, e.g., Office for Civil Rights Administrative Complaint at 5–7, In re
Anthem Silver Level QHPs in Wisconsin (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.chlpi.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/12/WI-ANTHEM.pdf.
149. See Andrews, supra note 147; Herper, supra note 134; Sharfstein et al.,
supra note 140.
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such, insurer practices like these should give us pause about the
idea of delinking approval and reimbursement without appropriate safeguards. If Medicare or Medicaid had been aiming to exclude a subset of drugs which have been approved with insufficient evidence of their efficacy, 150 that might produce less
concerning results. But if we could expect payers to exclude or
discriminate against patients where the drugs are highly effective, we ought to be concerned about that potential policy outcome from an access perspective.
B. ENCOURAGING INFORMATION PRODUCTION
Other potential policy implications of delinkage are more
positive. Perhaps most usefully for future innovation, if approval
and reimbursement were delinked, pharmaceutical companies
would know that they must earn insurance coverage. As such,
they might choose to run their clinical trials differently, to produce more socially valuable information. This is likely to be true
in at least two senses. First, we might gain more information
about the social value of particular drugs in an objective sense.
And second, we might gain more information about the comparative efficacy of particular products within a class.
First, public payers in particular might decline to pay for
FDA-approved products which have not demonstrated sufficient
evidence of safety and efficacy. More specifically, they might decline to pay for products that were approved on the basis of questionable surrogate endpoints. “A surrogate endpoint . . . is a laboratory measurement or a physical sign used as a substitute for
a clinically meaningful endpoint that measures directly how a
patient feels, functions, or survives.” 151 A classic example of a
surrogate endpoint is cholesterol. Drugs may be tested based on
their ability to lower a patient’s level of cholesterol, a surrogate
endpoint, rather than on their ability to decrease the risk of
death from heart disease, the true endpoint. If drugs approved
on the basis of their ability to lower cholesterol levels do not actually lower the risk of death from heart disease,152 payers may
150. See infra text accompanying notes 215–26 (discussing Massachusetts’s
proposed section 1115 waiver).
151. See Robert J. Temple, A Regulatory Authority’s Opinion About Surrogate Endpoints, in CLINICAL MEASUREMENT IN DRUG EVALUATION 3, 4 (Walter
S. Nimmo & Geoffrey T. Tucker eds., 1995); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2017)
(explaining that a new drug may be given market approval if the drug impacts
a surrogate endpoint).
152. See, e.g., Brendan M. Everett et al., Reducing LDL with PCSK9 Inhibitors—the Clinical Benefit of Lipid Drugs, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1588, 1589–90
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be reticent to pay for new drugs which do not come with evidence
of the true endpoint.
There are some surrogate endpoints which may have value
on their own. Consider cancer drug approvals. Two-thirds of cancer drugs are now approved on the basis of surrogate endpoints,
such as whether solid tumors have shrunk, or how long the patient was able to survive without their cancer progressing or recurring. 153 Yet often there is no evidence as to whether these
drugs actually enable patients to live longer—and in many cases
there is evidence that the drug has no overall survival benefit. 154
It may be that cancer patients value progression-free survival
even if there is no overall survival benefit. 155 But payers, patients, and physicians would benefit from knowing both pieces of
information about a particular product.
Second, in a delinked reimbursement world we may gain additional information about the comparative costs and benefits of
different drugs in a particular class. Today, this information is
scarce. Fewer drugs are approved on the basis of clinical trials
involving competing products, either direct or indirect competitors. For rare conditions and particularly for rare cancers, it is
increasingly common for products to be approved on the basis of
a single-arm trial, 156 in which the effects of the therapy to be
tested are not compared to the effects of any other intervention,
either placebo or comparator. In such circumstances, it may be
difficult for physicians to decide which new products they should
prescribe for their patients, where a choice is permissible.157

(2015).
153. Chul Kim & Vinay Prasad, Cancer Drugs Approved on the Basis of a
Surrogate End Point and Subsequent Overall Survival: An Analysis of Five
Years of U.S. Food and Drug Administration Approvals, 175 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
INTERNAL MED. 1992, 1992 (2015).
154. Id. at 1993.
155. See Lesley J. Fallowfield & Anne Fleissig, The Value of Progression-Free
Survival to Patients with Advanced-Stage Cancer, 9 NATURE REVIEWS CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 41, 45 (2012) (discussing an end-of-life care study in which seventytwo percent of patients preferred symptom-directed therapy over life-extending
therapy).
156. See, e.g., Himabindu Gaddipati et al., Rare Cancer Trial Design: Lessons from FDA Approvals, 18 CLINICAL CANCER RES. 5172, 5176 (2012).
157. INST. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REVIEW, POLY ADP-RIBOSE POLYMERASE
(PARP) INHIBITORS FOR OVARIAN CANCER: EFFECTIVENESS AND VALUE 38
(2017), https://icer-review.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/MWCEPAC_
OVARIAN_FINAL_EVIDENCE_REPORT_10112017.pdf.

2018]

DELINKING REIMBURSEMENT

2335

Companies also have little incentive to demonstrate the
safety and efficacy of their products relative to potential competitors, as long as insurers must cover both. Currently, in order to
demonstrate the comparative benefit of their product, a company
may need to run a particularly large, expensive trial, powered to
detect potential differences between two similar products. 158
Further, the company runs the risk that their trial may show no
benefit relative to their competitor, or that their competitor may
even emerge superior. 159 Thus companies are unlikely to expend
the time and money to conduct these trials where the result may
harm, not help, their market share.
Giving payers more control over the choice of products they
cover and the organization of their formularies may improve
pharmaceutical companies’ incentives to produce more information about their products and to differentiate between products in a class through the development of comparative-effectiveness data. Payers might decline to cover drugs approved on the
basis of more novel surrogate endpoints, or might manage to
strike innovative contracting deals (such as money-back requirements) to cover such drugs until sufficient data is produced. Further, payers would likely give preferred formulary placement to
drugs which can demonstrate superior safety or efficacy. Evidence-based physicians are likely to support these efforts, as it
would enable them to determine which drug in a particular class
would best fit the needs of their patients.
C. ADDRESSING THE DRUG PRICING PROBLEM
Third, delinkage also would likely help address the problems of high drug prices and spending, precisely because of both
of the above considerations addressed in this Part. There is general agreement that drug prices are too high, 160 although, to be
sure, there is much less agreement as to which drug prices are
158. See generally Daniel Garrun, Clinical Trial Delays: America’s Patient
Recruitment Dilemma, DRUG DEV. TECH. (July 18, 2012), http://www
.drugdevelopment-technology.com/features/featureclinical-trial-patient
-recruitment (discussing the obstacles clinical trials face in both expense and
volunteer recruitment).
159. Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and
the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1923–28 (2013) (“[T]here are asymmetrical incentives to provide positive and negative information about new
drugs.”).
160. See FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-52, § 609, 131
Stat. 1005, 1051 (expressing the need for Congress to take action to “lower the
costs of prescription drugs”); Cubanski & Neuman, supra note 109.
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too high, and whether it is individual or aggregate costs that are
more problematic. For instance, some products may not be considered worth their high prices because they do not provide significant social value, while others may be worth their prices but
impose budgetary concerns in the aggregate. 161 Nevertheless,
pharmaceuticals make up a significant share of overall
healthcare spending, and pharmaceutical spending is growing
quickly, 162 such that more serious efforts to lower either unit
prices or overall spending may soon be necessary.
Delinkage can help address these problems. A payer that
can credibly follow through on the threat not to cover a particular product can likely extract greater discounts in agreeing to
cover it. Alternatively, the payer could nudge patients toward
cheaper but similarly effective products through formulary management. Relatedly, our ability to distinguish between highvalue and low-value pharmaceuticals may improve with an increased amount of comparative-effectiveness research. This research may enable payers to offer better quality of care at the
same prices they had previously been paying, and to promote optimal treatment incentives among physicians and patients.
IV. CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE MODELS
A logical question to ask at this point is whether there are
systems in which delinkage has occurred that might serve as
models to interrogate this thought experiment. Specifically, we
might look at different models of delinkage and consider whether
these predictions have been met. There are at least three potential delinkage models to consider: (1) the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA); (2) the pharmaceutical approval and reimbursement system in a number of European countries; and (3)
the system of medical device approvals in the United States.
These models reveal that delinkage is likely to result in decreased access but also decreased prices, as predicted in Part III.

161. Ari B. Friedman & Janet Weiner, What’s the Story with Drug Prices?:
The Plot Thickens, LEONARD DAVIS INST. HEALTH ECON. (May 30, 2016),
https://ldi.upenn.edu/healthpolicysense/what’s-story-drug-prices.
162. National Health Expenditures 2016 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/
highlights.pdf (last visited June 18, 2018) (noting that retail prescription drug
spending grew by 8.9% in 2015, to encompass ten percent of overall health expenditures). Importantly, this is an underestimate, as it does not account for
drugs administered through the Part B program.
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However, the potential for using delinkage to develop more information about drugs may be more difficult to realize.
Importantly, none of these three models provides perfect information about what is likely to happen in the event of delinkage. The VA example exists within the United States, but its
overall magnitude and interaction with the rest of the healthcare
system may impair its generalizability. The European example
approaches a similar scale, but the different regulatory culture
and market incentives may limit its applicability as well. Finally, the medical-device approval system is premised on a very
different view of the FDA than is the drug approval system, limiting its relevance. As a result, the fact that we fail to see increased information production in any of these three cases may
not be dispositive.
But these results still matter for policy-based assessments
of delinkage’s impact. At its core, delinkage by necessity will
have some negative impact on access, even if it is narrowly tailored, and will likely also have a salutary impact on drug pricing.
This tradeoff is one that policymakers in the United States have
so far been unwilling to make. 163 Where the relative magnitude
of these potential changes is unknown, there is understandable
concern about making this tradeoff. However, if there is an additional social benefit to delinkage in the form of increased information production about these therapies, that benefit might embolden policymakers to take steps toward delinkage. If we have
reason to doubt that there would be such an additional benefit,
that doubt is similarly important to policymakers as they make
decisions about drug pricing policy.

163. In part, their unwillingness is also driven by concerns about the relationship between price and innovation. When faced with the prospect of policy
reforms that have the potential to lower their revenues, pharmaceutical companies respond by arguing that their ability to innovate and to develop new drugs
will be impaired. See, e.g., Jay Taylor, Government-Imposed Price Controls
Threaten Innovation and Access, PHRMA: THE CATALYST (May 9, 2017), https://
catalyst.phrma.org/government-imposed-price-controls-threaten-innovation
-and-access. This Article does not grapple directly with their arguments, other
than to present them obliquely infra in Part IV.C, but it is reasonable to think
that the scope and content of any proposed price reform would matter in the
innovation calculus.
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A. THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
In the United States, many veterans are entitled to publicly
funded health care through the VA.164 Like Medicaid, the VA is
entitled by law to a large statutory discount—twenty-four percent—off of the nonfederal AMP for the product. 165 But unlike
Medicaid, the VA is further entitled to create formularies and
exclude particular drugs from coverage. 166 Because these formularies are created at the national level, 167 the VA can leverage
its purchasing power to obtain greater discounts on particular
products.
The VA’s program clearly bears out two of the three hypotheses described in Part III. First, the VA’s program lowers prices
significantly as compared to Medicare and Medicaid. Estimates
suggest that the VA pays on average sixty percent of the prices
paid by Part D plans.168 And although the large statutory discounts available to Medicaid bring its prices closer to the range
paid by the VA, estimates suggest that even Medicaid pays more
than the VA for a significant minority of drugs. 169
Second, the VA’s program does lead to some decrease in access. One study noted that although private Medicare Part D
plans cover on average eighty-five percent of the top-selling 200
drugs in the country, the VA national formulary covers only fiftynine percent of these drugs. 170 As noted above, whether this decrease in access is a problem depends on the type and value of
drugs being excluded from the formulary. 171 But the fact that
164. Most veterans must meet a minimum duty requirement first. Health
Benefits: Veterans Eligibility, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., https://www.va.gov/
healthbenefits/apply/veterans.asp (last visited June 18, 2018).
165. 38 U.S.C. § 8126(a)(2) (2012).
166. Austin B. Frakt et al., Controlling Prescription Drug Costs: Regulation
and the Role of Interest Groups in Medicare and the Veterans Health Administration, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1079, 1081 (2008).
167. Id. at 1087.
168. Austin B. Frakt et al., Should Medicare Adopt the Veterans Health Administration Formulary?, 21 HEALTH ECON. 485, 487 (2012).
169. Thomas J. Hwang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Public Referendum on Drug
Prices in the US: Will It Bring Relief?, 355 BRITISH MED. J. 1, 2 (2016) (estimating that Medicaid likely pays more than the VA for thirty-three percent of drugs
by thirty percent on average). The VA is statutorily excluded from the calculation of the Medicaid best-price rule, as discussed throughout this Article.
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(C)(i)(I) (2012).
170. Frakt et al., supra note 168, at 490–91.
171. At least initially, the VA imposed restrictions on access to the new hepatitis C drugs similar to what has been observed in the Medicaid context. Patricia Kime, VA Expands Hepatitis C Treatment to All Patients with the Virus,
MILITARY TIMES (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.militarytimes.com/veterans/
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roughly one-third of VA patients with Medicare report having
additional prescription drug coverage through Part D plans suggests that they are using such coverage to supplement the VA’s
more restrictive formulary. 172
However, it does not appear that the VA’s delinkage has had
much of an impact on the development of information about the
comparative effectiveness of different products approved for the
same indication. Importantly, the VA is hoping to change this.
In mid-2017, the agency announced a partnership with the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER) to better enable
the agency to develop and use information about comparative
clinical effectiveness and cost effectiveness in their formulary
management process. 173 Further, the VA is a relatively small
program as compared to Medicare and Medicaid, serving 8.9 million Americans.174 In spending terms, the VA estimates that it
will spend just under seven billion dollars on drugs in 2017, 175
far less than either Medicare or Medicaid.176 It may be that the
size of the delinked market is insufficient to spur companies to
produce information that could then be used in the larger, linked
market.
B. EUROPEAN DELINKAGE MODELS
A second model of delinkage exists in most European countries. In these systems, approval by the European Medicines
Agency (EMA) or national regulator does not dictate coverage
requirements or terms on a national level. Consider the United
Kingdom’s system, perhaps the most well-studied model. Once a
2016/03/09/va-expands-hepatitis-c-treatment-to-all-patients-with-the-virus;
Rini, supra note 143.
172. GRACE HUANG ET AL., 2016 SURVEY OF VETERAN ENROLLEES’ HEALTH
AND USE OF HEALTH CARE 47 (2017), https://www.va.gov/HEALTHPOLICY
PLANNING/SoE2016/2016_Survey_of_Veteran_Enrollees_Health_and_
Health_Care.pdf. VA patients who have private insurance overwhelmingly report (eighty-two percent) that their private insurance includes a prescription
benefit. Id. at 46.
173. Press Release, Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, The Institute for Clinical and Economic Review To Collaborate with the Department of
Veterans Affairs’ Pharmacy Benefits Management Services Office (June 27,
2017), https://icer-review.org/announcements/va-release.
174. HUANG ET AL., supra note 172, at 2.
175. U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., MEDICAL PROGRAMS AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS VHA-207 (2017), https://www.va.gov/budget/docs/
summary/fy2018VabudgetVolumeIImedicalProgramsAndInformation
Technology.pdf.
176. See Medicare Drug Spending Dashboard 2015, supra note 38.
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drug is approved by the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) or the EMA, the National Institute for
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) conducts “technology appraisals” 177 on new drugs and makes recommendations to the
United Kingdom National Health Service (NHS) regarding reimbursement and use of the drug. 178 NICE considers not just the
clinical evidence for the drug, but also its economic evidence—
does the drug represent good value for money? NICE is likely to
recommend drugs for coverage by the NHS where the cost per
quality-adjusted life year (QALY) is between £20,000 and
£30,000 per QALY gained. 179
NICE’s technology-appraisal system, coupled with the lack
of a coverage mandate, means that nearly all branded drugs are
less expensive in the United Kingdom than they are through
Medicare. 180 But this decrease in price does come with a decrease
in access. NICE does not recommend that all drugs be covered,
and for certain types of drugs—particularly expensive cancer
drugs—this lack of coverage has created political problems for
the program. 181 In 2011, the NHS created the Cancer Drugs
Fund, devoting over £200 million to provide cancer drugs not
covered by the NHS. 182 While the Fund was originally scheduled
to end in 2014, it was extended until 2016 with its expenditure
during 2015–2016 amounting to £466 million.183 The United
Kingdom has now implemented a new model for appraising and
177. Technology Appraisal Guidance, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH & CARE EXhttps://www.nice.org.uk/About/What-we-do/Our-Programmes/NICE
-guidance/NICE-technology-appraisal-guidance (last visited June 18, 2018).
178. Id.
179. Of course, if the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio is less than
£20,000, NHS would prefer that. NICE has even created a fast track appraisal
(FTA) process for the most cost-effective treatments, where “the company’s
base-case incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) is less than £10,000 per
quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gained.” Our Processes, NAT’L INST. FOR
HEALTH & CARE EXCELLENCE, https://www.nice.org.uk/about/what-we-do/our
-programmes/nice-guidance/nice-technology-appraisal-guidance/process (last
visited June 18, 2018).
180. See Jeanne Whalen, Why the U.S. Pays More than Other Countries for
Drugs, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-u-s
-pays-more-than-other-countries-for-drugs-1448939481.
181. See, e.g., Health Economics: The Cancer Drugs Cost Conundrum, CANCER RES. UK (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/funding-for
-researchers/research-features/2016-08-10-health-economics-the-cancer
-drugs-cost-conundrum.
182. NHS ENGLAND CANCER DRUGS FUND TEAM, APPRAISAL AND FUNDING
OF CANCER DRUGS 5 (July 2016), https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2013/04/cdf-sop.pdf.
183. Id.
CELLENCE,
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reimbursing all cancer drugs under the Fund,184 which includes
a new category of recommendations when NICE considers there
to be “plausible potential for a drug to satisfy the criteria for routine commissioning, but where there is significant remaining
clinical uncertainty.” 185
This new program is designed to encourage the development
of additional clinical information about these products even after
they come to market. Once NICE recommends a drug as a Fund
candidate under this new category, the drug’s final coverage
through the fund depends on the pharmaceutical company accepting the requirements of the Fund under a Managed Access
Agreement,186 which includes the Fund Commercial Agreement. 187 This Agreement is “a confidential agreement between
NHS England and the pharmaceutical company, with input from
NICE,” and determines the level of reimbursement during the
managed-access period. 188 When there is sufficient data to address the original clinical uncertainty, the drug begins the process of exiting the Fund. 189 NICE then reappraises the drug resulting in a positive or negative recommendation for routine
commissioning.190 With this new model of appraisal and funding
for cancer drugs, NHS hopes to provide patients with increased
access to these medications, to “drive stronger value for money
for taxpayers in drugs expenditure,” and to offer “a new fasttrack route to NHS funding” for pharmaceutical companies willing to price drugs responsibly. 191
To date, the delinked systems present throughout much of
Europe have not produced the kind of additional information
about comparative effectiveness that might be the result of delinkage, as hypothesized in Part III.C. 192 The United Kingdom
in particular has produced a wealth of cost-effectiveness information about these products, but comparative effectiveness data
about drugs in a particular class are still lacking. It may be that
a more carefully designed system, on a broader scale, would be
needed to produce that information.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 22–23.
Id.
Id. at 6.
See supra Part III.C.

2342

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:2307

C. MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION
In the United States, there has historically been little or no
link between FDA approval and insurance reimbursement for
medical devices, particularly through CMS. As a result, medicaldevice companies have had to navigate two separate regulatory
systems: they must both obtain FDA approval and proceed
through CMS’s national-coverage determination to secure Medicare reimbursement for their device. 193 But the FDA and CMS
apply different legal standards to those determinations, 194 resulting in substantial uncertainty for device companies about
whether the information generated in the FDA approval process
will be sufficient to support a CMS coverage determination. 195
Even where a company has produced sufficient information, the
additional time required to go through the CMS coverage determination process after FDA approval is costly both for the company and for patients who may want to access the device in question.
The system of medical-device approval and coverage in the
United States is in some ways too distinct from our regulatory
structure around drugs to compare directly the impact of this
delinkage on price, access, and the development of comparativeeffectiveness information. Many devices are regulated only
lightly 196 or using an abbreviated follow-on pathway, in a way
193. LIZ RICHARDSON, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF: ALIGNING FDA AND CMS RE2 (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20150827
.132391/full/healthpolicybrief_143.pdf.
194. The FDA ensures that devices are “safe and effective.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 360e(c)(1)(A) (2012) (providing that applicants for medical device premarket
approval must show “whether or not such device is safe and effective”). CMS
covers products that are “reasonable and necessary.” See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2012) (providing that “no payment may be made . . . for any
expenses incurred for items or services . . . not reasonable and necessary for the
diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a
malformed body member ”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B) (describing part of
the FDA’s mission as “ensuring that . . . human and veterinary drugs are safe
and effective”).
195. RICHARDSON, supra note 193 (“ This can lead to cases in which the FDA
approves a product that is subsequently denied Medicare coverage because the
evidence collected in pivotal clinical trials does not meet the ‘reasonable and
necessary’ bar.”).
196. Medical devices are regulated under a risk-based framework. Under
this system, low-risk (designated as Class I) devices, such as tongue depressors,
are subject only to “general controls,” such as reporting and adherence to good
manufacturing practices. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A). By contrast, high-risk (designated as Class III) devices, such as artificial hearts, are subject to more stringent controls, typically including premarket approval requirements. 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c(a)(1)(C); see also Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving
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that does not resemble the pharmaceutical approval pathway. 197
Many laboratory diagnostics (which arguably fall under the statutory definition of “device”) 198 are essentially unregulated by the
FDA,199 and CMS even sets rates for their reimbursement. 200
This divergent approval structure means that it is difficult to determine whether we should expect to observe the development of
comparative-effectiveness information in the device context.
However, there is still an important lesson to be gleaned from
the system of medical-device approval and coverage.
Specifically, the medical-device system provides a window
into how the regulated industry may react when faced with two
separate regulatory systems they must satisfy. Medical-device
companies do not like having to deal with separate regulators.
They complain about the cost and uncertainty of the process, and
they argue that it makes attracting venture capital funding for
innovation difficult.201 They would undoubtedly prefer to have
FDA approval automatically trigger insurance reimbursement.
Pharmaceutical companies worry even today about the burdens placed on them by the FDA approval process. If they must
the Future of Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1894–95
(2016) (explaining the FDA’s risk classification system).
197. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 510(k), 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2012).
See generally Jeffrey K. Shapiro, Substantial Equivalence Premarket Review:
The Right Approach for Most Medical Devices, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 365 (2014)
(discussing § 510(k) and suggesting that substantial equivalence is a sound approach for most medical devices).
198. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act gives the FDA the authority
to regulate any medical device, defined as “an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is . . . intended
for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment or prevention of disease.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (emphasis added).
199. FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF, AND CLINICAL LABORATORIES: FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY
OVERSIGHT OF LABORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS 5 (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www
.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/UCM416685.pdf.
200. The Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule sets the rates at which Medicare
will reimburse outpatient laboratory testing services. Clinical Laboratory Fee
Schedule (2014), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms
.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ClinicalLabFeeSched/
Clinical-Laboratory-Fee-Schedule-Files-Items/14CLAB.html (last visited June
18, 2018).
201. INNOVATION COUNSELLORS, A FUTURE AT RISK: ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND VENTURE CAPITAL IN THE U.S. MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY SECTOR 25 (Oct. 2016), https://www.advamed.org/sites/default/
files/resource/a_future_at_risk_advamed_october_2016.pdf.
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satisfy both regulators, we can expect their concern with the system to increase accordingly. As such, we might consider whether
programs that have been developed to lower the cost and uncertainty of development in the medical-device context might be extended to pharmaceuticals in the event that a delinkage proposal
is implemented. These programs still permit the two regulatory
systems to function independently, but ameliorate some of the
additional regulatory burden they might impose.
At least two such systems have already been developed. The
first is a parallel review program, allowing medical-device product sponsors to request that CMS begin the coverage-determination process while the product is still under review by the
FDA.202 The idea is to partially collapse the two review timelines
and permit product sponsors to anticipate and develop the data
needed by both agencies. The program was formally made permanent in 2016,203 although in its first five years of operation,
just a single device was approved through the program—Cologuard, a noninvasive colorectal-cancer screening test. 204 If
used more widely,205 the parallel review program should reduce
the cost and uncertainty faced by medical-device companies in
dealing with separate regulatory bodies.
The second such system is coverage with evidence development (CED). The idea is to permit CMS to provide reimbursement for particular technologies on the condition that the manufacturers continue to gather clinical data about the
technologies. 206 That data can later be used to evaluate more
202. Program for Parallel Review of Medical Devices, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,113
(Oct. 24, 2016).
203. Id.
204. RICHARDSON, supra note 193, at 4. It is worth noting that at least one
other product, from Medtronic, failed to demonstrate efficacy in its Phase III
trial and thus did not complete the program. Id.
205. It is unclear why medical device companies have not yet embraced the
program. Reports supported by AdvaMed, the trade organization representing
the industry, state only that the parallel review program “has limitations and
would require modification[s]” to achieve its goals. INNOVATION COUNSELLORS,
supra note 201. However, it is unclear what modifications they would like to
see. Id.
206. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR THE PUBLIC, INDUSTRY, AND CMS STAFF, NATIONAL
COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS WITH DATA COLLECTION AS A CONDITION OF COVERAGE: COVERAGE WITH EVIDENCE DEVELOPMENT (July 12, 2006), https://
www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/DeterminationProcess/downloads/ced.pdf.
Coverage with evidence development is also available for services (not only technologies), but for my purposes I have focused on its relationship to health care
technology products. Id.
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fully the technology for an official coverage determination. CMS
has implemented CED protocols roughly twenty times,207 but in
only two cases has CMS used the process to revise its coverage
determination. 208 More rigorous use of CED to review the coverage of promising but ultimately investigational devices might
provide a sample framework for use in the drug context as
well. 209
V. THEORIZING INTERMEDIATE SOLUTIONS
Policymakers wishing to achieve the potential benefits of delinkage while avoiding the potential social costs may wish to design guardrails more purposefully to achieve these outcomes.
Simply removing the requirements that payers cover particular
classes of drugs may achieve some cost savings, but it is likely to
have a detrimental effect on access in a way that is not necessarily evidence-based, and it may be unlikely to lead to the development of comparative-effectiveness information on its own.
This Part considers three potential intermediate solutions, each
of which would balance the benefits and costs of delinkage.
Importantly, each of these intermediate solutions is motivated by a different theoretical model of the purpose of the FDA
and its relationship to insurance reimbursement. On the view
that the FDA’s central purpose is to approve safe, effective drugs
and CMS’s central purpose is to provide access to those drugs,
partial delinkage models that focus on evidence development
may be attractive. On the view that gives primacy to the role of
the FDA as an information-generating agency, solutions that
provide CMS with an opportunity to direct the development of
the relevant evidence may be helpful. And on a view of both
agencies as driven to promote socially valuable innovation, realigning payment incentives with the development of clinical trial
information would be important.

207. RICHARDSON, supra note 193, at 3. Examples may be found at Coverage
with Evidence Development, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/Coverage-with-Evidence-Development (last
visited June 18, 2018).
208. RICHARDSON, supra note 193, at 3.
209. See, e.g., Rebecca Eisenberg & Harold Varmus, Insurance for Broad Genomic Tests in Oncology, 358 SCIENCE 1133, 1134 (2017).
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A. CONSUMER PROTECTION AND PARTIAL DELINKAGE
One traditional view of the FDA emphasizes its consumer
protection function.210 On this view, the public must be able to
trust that when they purchase a prescription drug, the FDA’s
stamp of approval means that the product is safe and effective.
The Agency’s reputation matters. 211 On the other side, a traditional view of payers, and of Medicare and Medicaid in particular, is to help ensure that patients can access and afford needed
medical care. 212 Whether at their creation in 1965 or their expansions decades later, politicians have emphasized the importance of these programs in providing not just care, but financial stability.213
For those holding strong versions of both of these views (consumer protection and access), a strong legal link between FDA
approval and insurance coverage may be logically attractive. If
the FDA only approves products that have been shown to be safe
and effective, and if the purpose of insurance is to help patients
afford needed medical care, surely insurers should cover a wide
range of therapies. This perspective does not logically require the
precise system Medicare and Medicaid have now, but it might be
consistent with a requirement to cover a certain number of drugs
per class, or to prevent discrimination on the basis of particular
health conditions.
However, this linkage only holds true if the FDA is approving only products that have been proven to be safe and effective.
As described in Parts I and II above, the FDA now approves a
whole range of drugs that have not yet been shown to be effective
for their target indication. When the FDA is approving drugs on
the basis of surrogate endpoints with labels stating that “[a] clinical benefit . . . has not been established,” 214 does paying for such
products really serve the purpose of ensuring access to care? It
210. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 367, 387 (2007).
211. CARPENTER, supra note 102, at 10–11 (discussing the regulatory power
of the FDA gained through reputation).
212. See STARR, supra note 28, at 367; Ruger, supra note 23, at 220.
213. See, e.g., Nancy-Ann Min DeParle, Celebrating 35 Years of Medicare
and Medicaid, 22 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1, 1 (2000) (quoting President
Johnson signing Medicare and Medicaid into law); Dan Collins, Bush Signs
Medicare Bill, CBS (Oct. 23, 2003), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bush-signs
-medicare-bill (quoting President Bush at the signing ceremony for Medicare
Part D as helping seniors “find affordable medical care in the later years of life”).
214. Highlights of Prescribing Information: EXONDYS 51, FDA (2016),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/206488lbl.pdf.
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does not obviously do so in a system of limited resources. Similarly, it may undermine trust in the FDA as a consumer regulator.
These dual goals might therefore be served by partial delinkage, where the delinkage is limited to certain classes of drugs
or to drugs with particular characteristics. A thoughtful recent
example of such a proposal comes from Massachusetts, whose
Medicaid program has applied for a waiver of the prescription
drug coverage requirements.215 Specifically, Massachusetts is
seeking to make two kinds of changes to its program. First, to
adopt a closed formulary of the type used by private payers and
Medicare Part D plans to the extent they are permitted to select
two drugs per class to cover. 216 Second and more novel, to exclude from the formulary entirely drugs “with limited or inadequate evidence of clinical efficacy.” 217
In requesting this second set of exclusions, Massachusetts is
expressing concern about the interaction between the Medicaid
coverage requirements and accelerated approval, as discussed
above in Part I.218 Massachusetts is particularly worried about
drugs coming to market through the accelerated approval pathway which “have not yet demonstrated clinical benefit and have
been studied in clinical trials using only surrogate endpoints.” 219
Importantly, Massachusetts does not seek to exclude such drugs
entirely or indefinitely. Drugs that have demonstrated “incremental clinical value relative to peer drugs” in their class would
still be covered.220 But drugs that have yet to demonstrate such
a benefit would be candidates for potential exclusion from the
formulary.
This second set of exclusions does not single out drugs on
the basis of disease or even necessarily expense, although expense is certainly central to Massachusetts’s decision to ask for
the waiver in the first place.221 Instead, it is focused on drugs
approved on the basis of comparatively weaker evidence.222 As
215. See COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., MASSHEALTH SECTION 1115 DEMONAMENDMENT REQUEST (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/
medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/waivers/1115/downloads/ma/ma
-masshealth-pa3.pdf.
216. Id. at 8–9.
217. Id. at 9.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 72–80.
219. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 215, at 9.
220. Id. at 10.
221. Id. at 8.
222. Id. at 9.
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such, Massachusetts’s waiver application is designed to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of delinkage. Massachusetts is clearly hoping to achieve some cost savings as a result of
this delinkage, both directly (by excluding drugs for which there
is little evidence of efficacy) and indirectly (by increasing their
negotiation leverage over the drugs that remain). Massachusetts’s program also seems designed to lead to the production of
information about the comparative effectiveness of new drugs. 223
At the same time, there would be some reduction in access
to medicines. Massachusetts has thought seriously about ways
to minimize the therapeutic effects of decreased access,224 but
policymakers should carefully consider the patients who are
likely to be impacted. If the reduction in access falls disproportionately on historically marginalized patients with certain diseases (such as cancer or orphan conditions), policymakers might
try to create other options for patients that impose financial risk
on the drug companies, not the states. For instance, states implementing proposals like these might be incentivized to strike
outcomes-based deals with drug companies. 225 The companies
would agree to provide their products to particular patients, but
they would be paid only if follow-on clinical trials demonstrated
clear efficacy.226
B. INFORMATION PRODUCTION AND INTERAGENCY
COLLABORATION
A more modern view of the FDA, represented most clearly
by the work of Professor Rebecca Eisenberg, conceives of the
FDA as an information-producing, innovation-focused agency. 227
As she has written, “If a century ago the goal of drug regulation
was to protect people from poisons, today drug regulation guides
223. If adopted by Massachusetts alone, the threat of a formulary exclusion
may not be sufficient to encourage companies to produce the relevant data sets.
As noted in Part IV, supra, the size of the market may be too small to encourage
companies to develop the information.
224. See COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 215, at 9 (detailing the proposed exceptions process for patients who need access to excluded products).
225. Cf. Rachel E. Sachs et al., Innovative Contracting for Pharmaceuticals
and Medicaid’s Best-Price Rule, 43 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 5, 10 (2018).
226. See, e.g., Katie Thomas & Charles Ornstein, Considering the Side Effects of Drugmakers’ Money-Back Guarantees, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/health/prescription-drugs-cost.html (“Italy now asks drug companies to provide some of their products for free—at first.
Manufacturers are only paid once results are demonstrated.”).
227. Eisenberg, supra note 210, at 348.
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the development of information that turns poisons, used advisedly, into drugs.” 228 Eisenberg portrays the FDA’s clinical trial
requirements as a tool to force pharmaceutical companies to produce information about the safety and efficacy of their products—information they would otherwise be unlikely to produce
on their own.229
Similarly, more modern views of insurers (particularly public insurers) consider them not only as a means of providing access to care for patients, but also as tools to encourage evidenceand value-based care. On this view, insurers can and should aim
to compensate providers on the basis of the quality, not the quantity, of the care they provide. In this vein, HHS is aiming to continue to increase the amount of reimbursement that is based on
quality or value rather than volume.230 Unfortunately, to date
this initiative has largely been limited to hospital and physician
services.231 The coverage mandates described herein likely limit
CMS’s ability to extend these new payment models from
healthcare services to healthcare technologies.
Under this set of views about the agencies’ purposes, it is
not clear that there is a strong logical need to link approval and
coverage as a matter of law. If the FDA is appropriately channeling companies toward the production of information that is
needed to enable insurers and physicians to make evidence- and
value-based decisions about care, a coverage mandate would not
obviously be necessary. A coverage mandate might even get in
the way of payers’ attempts to obtain value-based prices for new
medicines. That is, if FDA clinical-trial results show that a drug
is likely to lead to a particular level of benefit, requiring insurers
to cover that drug may permit its manufacturer to charge a price
that is out of proportion to the value it provides.

228. Id. at 347.
229. See id. at 370; see also Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 159, at 1922.
230. Better, Smarter, Healthier, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
(Jan. 26, 2015), http://wayback.archive-it.org/3926/20170127185400/http://www
.hhs.gov/about/news/2015/01/26/better-smarter-healthier-in-historic
-announcement-hhs-sets-clear-goals-and-timeline-for-shifting-medicare
-reimbursements-from-volume-to-value.html (setting goals “of tying 85 percent
of all traditional Medicare payments to quality or value by 2016 and 90 percent
by 2018”).
231. Cf. Sylvia M. Burwell, Setting Value-Based Payment Goals—HHS Efforts to Improve U.S. Health Care, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 897, 897 (2015) (emphasizing provider “teamwork and integration” and “effective coordination of
providers across settings”); see infra text accompanying notes 247–48 (discussing the Administration’s cancellation of the Part B pharmaceutical demo).
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A solution that adopts these perspectives of agency purpose
might address the issue not necessarily by giving CMS or other
payers the ability to decline to pay for FDA-approved drugs, but
by giving them input into the FDA approval process to begin
with. This can be done either procedurally or substantively, in a
way that provides CMS with more or less power over the process.
A procedural intervention which is merely exhortatory might involve CMS in the process by which the FDA decides whether a
potential new drug would be eligible for the Accelerated Approval program. As discussed in Part I, the program is intended
to address “serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions and
unmet medical needs.”232 But how is the FDA to know whether
a particular condition qualifies as serious or whether the medical
need is unmet? These determinations can be informed by evidence possessed by CMS, in its role as insurer for over
100,000,000 Americans.233
Regulators might also imagine a program more akin to the
parallel review program described above that the agencies have
developed in the device context. 234 Under this more substantive
intervention, delinkage would be coupled with CMS involvement
in the clinical-trials process. CMS would be able to recommend
to pharmaceutical companies just beginning clinical trials the
kinds of clinical evidence they would need to produce to achieve
a formulary placement, or even a favorable one. At that point,
companies could choose whether to complete the recommended
trials. If they choose not to, they may obtain FDA approval—
with full knowledge that there may be little payer appetite for
their products. And if they do complete the trials, FDA approval
will bring the release of clinical-trial information that is far more
useful to payers. 235
The impact of this intervention on the three potential outcomes described above likely depends on the level at which the
intervention is adopted. A program resembling parallel review
has the potential to increase the production of information that
is truly useful to the healthcare system, such as comparativeeffectiveness information, because such information is requested
232. 21 U.S.C. § 356(e)(1) (2012).
233. See FISCAL YEAR 2016 JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES, supra note 21, at
109–10.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 202–05.
235. Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, II, Promoting
Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. BIOSCIENCES 3, 15–24 (2017)
(exploring potential opportunities for payers and examining the role health insurers may play separately in the development of such information).
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ex ante and payers retain the ability to decline to pay for products approved without such information. A more procedural intervention in which CMS provides assistance to the FDA in determining which products should proceed through the
accelerated-approval pathway, but which still requires CMS to
cover such products once approved, would be unlikely to have an
effect on the development of comparative-effectiveness evidence.
One potential concern about this set of interventions is that
they might decenter the role of the FDA in the drug approval
process, elevating the role of CMS by comparison. Even as scholars have come to view the FDA as serving this valuable information-forcing function, to most patients it still holds its respected consumer protection position.236 CMS has not needed to
cultivate public trust in the same way, and arguably it has become a site of more political strife since the passage of the ACA.
Injecting CMS into the supposedly apolitical FDA approval process 237 might, in the eyes of some members of the public, taint
that process. As such, policymakers might be especially cautious
before requiring measures that go beyond information sharing.
C. ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN AN INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM
A third set of policy proposals comes from recognizing not
only the FDA’s centrality in the development of innovative new
therapies, but CMS’s role in the process as well. There are a
number of FDA initiatives designed to promote innovation in socially valuable areas that may be understudied by the private
sector. For instance, the four expedited review programs described above encourage companies to invest in new therapies
for serious illnesses lacking existing treatments. 238 As another
example, the Orphan Drug Act provides extra incentives for companies to study diseases affecting few Americans, 239 which might
236. CARPENTER, supra note 102, at 10–11.
237. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 47 (2010) (“[T]he FDA is relatively more independent than other executive agencies, with its heads often
advocating for drug regulation regardless of the position of their appointing
president.”).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 73–80.
239. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (2012) (conferring seven years of market exclusivity on orphan products); 26 U.S.C. § 45C(a) (2012) (conferring a fifty percent
tax credit for eligible clinical trial expenses). However, Congress’s 2017 tax overhaul reduced the credit to twenty-five percent. P.L. No. 115-97, 115th Cong.,
§ 13401(a) (“Modification of Orphan Drug Credit”). See also Daniel J. Hemel &
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents—Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L.
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not otherwise be serious topics of study. 240 The process is not
perfect, and there is much work left to do. But policymakers
clearly understand the potential benefits of implementing innovation-related policies through the FDA approval process.
As of yet, policymakers have largely not viewed insurance
generally, and CMS more specifically, as capable of advancing
these policy goals.241 This is a mistake. As scholars have recognized, prescription drug insurance closely resembles prize systems that have been theorized to provide incentives for the development of new medicines.242 Pharmaceutical companies who
know that insurers must pay for their products can rely on a certain level of rewards, and they may redirect their innovative activities accordingly. For example, scholars have studied the creation of the Medicare Part D program, finding that
REV. 303, 379 (2013) (describing how the Act increased government grants,
market exclusivity, and tax credits for companies studying rare diseases).
240. Some have questioned whether the Orphan Drug Act has gone too far,
however. See, e.g., Sarah Jane Tribble, Senator Grassley Launches Inquiry Into
Orphan Drug Law’s Effect on Prices, NPR (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www
.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/02/10/514373480/sen-grassley-launches
-inquiry-into-orphan-drug-laws-effect-on-prices (stating that officials have become interested in revisiting Orphan Drug legislation); Nicholas Bagley, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST, The Benefits and Costs of Promoting the Development of
New Orphan Drugs, pt. 3 (2017), https://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/
wp-content/uploads/2017/02/2.12-orphan-drug.pdf (outlining the costs and
problems surrounding Orphan Drug legislation).
241. Congress’s one foray into this area, Medicare’s New Technology Add-on
Payment, directs CMS to create a procedure to identify new medical technologies and provide additional payments to encourage their use. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww (2012) (outlining the determination of costs and payments within hospital services settings); see also Alexandra T. Clyde et al., Experience With Medicare’s New Technology Add-On Payment Program, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1632, 1632–
33 (2008) (“Without appropriate payment to the hospital at the point of use,
technologies that provide value to patients and the health care system over time
might not be available to patients.”).
242. See, e.g., William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, Empirical, and Historical Perspectives, at 12 (May 2, 2001), http://cyber
.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Innovation.pdf (discussing rewards as ways to
stimulate innovation); see also, e.g., Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 613, 645–55 (2010) (discussing insurance reimbursement
broadly, finding that they “are a key policy lever for antibiotic effectiveness . . . .”); Arti K. Rai, The Ends of Intellectual Property: Health as a Case
Study, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 128–29 (2007) (stating that there is
little difference between universal health-insurance schemes based on purchasing and those based on prizes); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus
Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1012–13 (2014) (describing
government rewards for new drugs as similar to a prize system); Sachs, supra
note 4, at 178 (finding that “prescription drug insurance strongly resembles a
prize system”).
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pharmaceutical companies engaged in increased investment into
drug classes with higher consumption among the Medicare population when more seniors had access to comprehensive prescription drug coverage. 243 And yet to date, health insurance has
traditionally been viewed by policymakers as a tool only for promoting access to healthcare technologies.
Recalibrating our view of insurance as a tool for promoting
innovation as well as access reveals ways in which policymakers
might realign reimbursement more closely with the FDA and innovation incentives. This is true for both relatively weak and relatively strong interventions, and those along a spectrum in between. A relatively weak intervention would involve reforming
the way in which physicians are reimbursed for prescribing and
administering drugs under Medicare Part B. As discussed in
Part I, many expensive biologics are administered in physicians’
offices and reimbursed under Part B. 244 When the physician is
reimbursed for providing the drug to her patients, she is reimbursed not based on the value of the drug she provides but instead receives a fee based on a percentage of its price. 245 Many
scholars and policymakers have argued that this system may encourage physicians to prescribe and administer more expensive
drugs than may be medically necessary. 246 Providing a flat fee
instead of a percentage would help nudge providers in the right
direction from a prescription perspective. Relatedly, toward the
end of the Obama Administration, CMS sought to implement
243. See Margaret E. Blume-Kohout & Neeraj Sood, The Impact of Medicare
Part D on Pharmaceutical R&D 12–13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13857, 2008). But see Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Linn, Market
Size in Innovation: Theory and Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry, 119
Q.J. ECON. 1049, 1084 (2004) (describing the effects profit incentives have on
innovation as requiring further research); David Dranove et al., Pharmaceutical
Profits and the Social Value of Innovation 6–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 20212, 2014) (qualifying the findings of Blume-Kohout and
Sood by noting that truly innovative activity takes longer to emerge). Relatedly,
Professor Amy Finkelstein has discovered that several policies designed to increase the uptake of vaccines (including Medicare’s 1993 decision to cover the
flu vaccine) resulted in an increase in clinical trials for new vaccines. Amy
Finkelstein, Static and Dynamic Effects of Health Policy: Evidence from the Vaccine Industry, 119 Q.J. ECON. 527, 556–57 (2004).
244. MEDPAC, supra note 4, at 121.
245. See id. at 117.
246. See id. at 118 (explaining that the reimbursement might incentivize
physicians, noting that “a higher priced drug generates more revenue for the
provider ”); Patricia M. Danzon et al., Alternative Strategies for Medicare Payment of Outpatient Prescription Drugs—Part B and Beyond, 11 AM. J. MANAGED
CARE 173, 173 (2005) (describing generally how reimbursement may result in
higher prices for private and public purchasers).
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such a program as a demonstration project. 247 Industry groups,
especially the oncologists that prescribe many of these drugs and
the pharmaceutical companies that make them, objected vociferously and the program was never implemented.248
An intermediate intervention may be implemented in the
Medicaid program. Recall that Medicaid is entitled by law to
large statutory discounts off of the average manufacturer price
for a drug, or, if lower, the best price available to a specified
group of payers. 249 This is a sign of a program that is designed
for access. The goal here is to spend as little as possible on each
drug, to use scarce resources efficiently, and to care for as many
people as possible. But at present, Medicaid likely dampens incentives to develop drugs primarily for low-income Americans.
Pharmaceutical companies know that if they choose to develop
products with high Medicaid market share, their potential revenue will be lower than if most patients with the disease in question are on Medicare or private insurance.250
Happily, Medicaid’s reimbursement system can be recalibrated to balance incentives for both innovation and access and
provide additional incentives to companies who choose to invest
in developing drugs for diseases prevalent among low-income
Americans. One option would be to equalize down the rates that
private payers and Medicare pay for these products, removing
the innovation distortion in favor of diseases of affluence, while

247. Medicare Program: Part B Drug Payment Model, 81 Fed. Reg. 13230
(Mar. 11, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 511).
248. See, e.g., CMS Formally Withdraws Medicare Part B Demo, AM. SOC’Y
OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.asco.org/advocacy-policy/
asco-in-action/cms-formally-withdraws-medicare-part-b-demo (“ASCO has opposed the demo since its release in March 2016, citing a flawed premise, experimental nature, and lack of important patient protections.”); Allison Funk, Medicare Monday: 3 Things to Know About the Government’s Medicare Payment
Change, PHRMA (Mar. 14, 2016), http://catalyst.phrma.org/medicare-monday-3
-things-to-know-about-the-governments-medicare-payment-change
(“[T]his
proposal . . . could discourage investment in future treatment advances . . . .”).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (2012).
250. This is not merely a problem within the U.S. market. Tiered pricing of
the type used here is typically viewed by economists as a potential win-win
strategy for producers seeking profits and low-income patients seeking access
to medicines. See, e.g., Jens Plahte, Tiered Pricing of Vaccines: A Win-Win-Win
Situation, Not a Subsidy, 5 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASE 58, 59–60 (2005) (arguing that tiered pricing contributes to the overall welfare of the involved parties, creating a “win-win-win” situation). But where the primary patient market
is a low-income one, tiered pricing alone may be insufficient to encourage the
development of such products in the first instance.
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at the same time helping mitigate our problem of drug spending. 251 Another option would be to equalize up the rates that
Medicaid pays for a particular set of products, 252 providing bonuses to companies who choose to invest in products primarily
for low-income Americans. 253 The simplest way to implement
such an incentive would be to waive at least a portion of the required Medicaid rebate these companies must pay. A 23.1% or
more 254 increase in reimbursement for any particular product
may well make a difference to companies choosing to invest in
the first instance.
The two previous interventions can be accomplished within
the framework of our existing system, maintaining the linkage
between approval and reimbursement in public programs. A
third option would be to move toward a model like that in the
United Kingdom as described in Part IV, going even further in
involving payers to incentivize innovation. Paying for drugs
based on the social value they provide, rather than on the price
the manufacturer can demand in a linked market, might push
companies toward different areas of research than they are currently prioritizing. This intervention would require not only delinkage, but also a more robust policy conversation about what
our society is willing to pay for than we have had so far. But from
251. Proposals suggesting that Medicare Part D adopt the provision that insulates the Medicaid program when drug prices rise faster than inflation fall
into this category. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 70,
at 8–9 (finding that total rebates were higher under Medicaid than Medicare
Part D, Medicaid’s net unit costs were lower, and one half of manufacturer-owed
rebates could be attributed to add-on, inflation-based rebates). Proposals that
would reimburse drugs for dually eligible patients at Medicaid rates would accomplish this for a subset of the Medicare population. Gretchen Jacobson et al.,
Summary of Medicare Provisions in the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2016,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 3, 2015), http://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/
summary-of-medicare-provisions-in-the-presidents-budget-for-fiscal-year
-2016.
252. The choice between equalizing down or up, and in either case how far
to do so, is ultimately an empirical question that depends on a range of considerations. Compare Alan M. Garber et al., Insurance and Incentives for Medical
Innovation 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12080, 2006)
(arguing that pharmaceutical companies possess excessive incentives for innovation), with Darius Lakdawalla & Neeraj Sood, Insurance and Innovation in
Health Care Markets 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
11602, 2005) (arguing that incentives for innovation are insufficient).
253. I explore this proposal in more detail in Sachs, supra note 4.
254. Given that states are empowered to seek supplemental rebates beyond
the required 23.1%, the percentage change may be even greater. U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATES’ COLLECTION OF OFFSET AND SUPPLEMENTAL MEDICAID REBATES 5 n.19 (2014).

2356

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:2307

the perspective of not just providing access to medicines, but also
encouraging innovation into the most needed technologies, an
intervention along these lines may be more useful.
CONCLUSION
Scholars and policymakers are rightly interested in opportunities for reform of both the FDA and health-insurance system
in this country. Simultaneously, there is broad agreement about
the need to take action to address the problems of drug pricing.
Yet the failure to appreciate the linkage between FDA approval
and insurance reimbursement has thus far stalled the development of potential policies to solve both problems. This Article’s
evaluation of that linkage presents options for scholars and policymakers to pursue going forward.

